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ABSTRACT
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, ISRAEL, AND
CONTAINMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
1945-1952
L.S. Tarbutton II
Old Dominion University, 1990
Director: Dr. Lorraine M. Lees
This thesis examines United States policy towards
Israel from 1948 to 1952 to determine the extent to which
the support given to Israel during the Truman administration
reflected the major United States policy goal in the Middle
East, the containment of the Soviet Union.
Sources used in this thesis include: archival material;
printed collections of documents; memoirs; and secondary
sources.
The Truman administration pursued containment in the
Middle East by cooperating with Great Britain to improve the
economic and military well-being of the Arab states so they
could resist any Soviet attempts to dominate the region.
However, domestic political pressure persuaded the Truman
administration to also become the major international
supporter of Israel; the sworn enemy of the Arab states.
Therefore, Truman's decision to support Israel undermined
United States attempts to strengthen the Arab states and
weakened the United States containment policy in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years immediately following World War II, the
United states and the soviet Union vied for influence in the
Middle East and elsewhere across the globe.

In response to

this struggle, the United States developed a policy of
containing the spread of Soviet influence in areas vital to
United states interests. Devised by George F. Kennan,
containment stressed a number of means to resist Soviet
influence, including the development of economically
independent nations in areas vital to United States
interests.

Thus Kennan postulated, these areas would resist

the lure of communist subversion.1
In 1948, at the height of this East-West struggle,
Jewish settlers in Palestine created the state of Israel.
The administration of Harry s. Truman played a major role in
bringing the Jewish state to fruition and the United States
has continued to be Israel's most reliable international
supporter.

United States favor proved critical to an

Israeli nation born of war with the Arab states, and
American economic support, both private and governmental,
1John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25-53.
1

2

helped ensure the survival of Israel. 2
Yet most State Department officials perceived these
developments as detrimental to containment in the Middle
East.

Department strategists had determined after World War

II that the oil reserves in the Middle East made the region
vital to the United States.

The Soviets also demonstrated a

growing interest in the Middle East after World War II.

The

United States, therefore, attempted to contain Soviet
influence in the Middle East by improving economic
conditions in the region.

The British, who had considerable

influence in the region, agreed to help the United States in
enhancing the vitality of the Middle East.

In 1947, the

United States and Great Britain agreed to pursue "parallel
policies" in the Middle East to foster economic improvements
among the Arab states.

Yet existing political circumstances

in the Middle East complicated United States containment
policies.
Great Britain's colonial domination of the Middle East
had inspired deep resentment among the Arab states.

The

British remained the major economic and military partners of
the Arab states, but growing Arab nationalism endangered the
future of British holdings in the region.

This made the

British less than ideal partners for implementing a Middle
East containment policy.

Equally problematic for United

2 stephen Green, Taking Sides (New York: William Morrow
and Company, 1984), 80-83.

3

states containment policy was British opposition to a Jewish
state in Palestine.

The British refused to support any

Jewish state in Palestine because her Arab allies would
consider it a serious threat to their security. 3
The State Department was also reluctant to support the
claims of Jewish settlers in Palestine because of Arab
opposition.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall believed

that support for a Jewish state in Palestine would alienate
the Arab world and make the region vulnerable to Soviet
aggression or subversion.

However, Jewish-Americans lobbied

the Truman administration to support a Jewish state in
Palestine.

President Harry S. Truman found himself in a

difficult political situation in 1948.

While Truman's major

foreign policy objective in the Middle East remained the
containment of the Soviet Union by revitalizing the Arab
states, he had sympathy for the plight of Jewish refugees in
Europe who wished to immigrate to Palestine.

Furthermore,

1948 was a presidential election year and Truman's main
political advisor, Clark Clifford, perceived the Jewish vote
in New York as the key to winning the election. 4
Truman attempted to balance the perceived need for a
3 wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East
1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 381-420.
4 Bruce Kuniholm and Michael Rubner, The Palestinian
Problem and United States Policy (Claremont, California:
Regina Books, 1986), 40-51; John Snetsinger, Truman, the
Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel (Stanford: Hoover
Institute Press, 1972), 95-97.

4

strong containment policy in the Middle East, which required
the cooperation of the Arabs and the British, against the
need to help Jewish refugees relocate in Palestine, which
would solve a pressing humanitarian problem and be
politically beneficial.

Eventually Truman decided to

support the creation of Israel, thus solving the refugee
problem and satisfying Jewish-American voters.

At the same

time, the Truman administration attempted to maintain
relations with the Arab states to promote containment and to
protect vital oil interests in the region.

However,

congressional opposition to aid for the Arab states, because
of those states' animosity toward Israel, made it difficult
to send substantive aid to them.

Stymied by Congress, the

Truman administration sought ways to fund the Arabs without
congressional approval.

Although the Truman administration

attempted to aid the Arabs through third parties, this
assistance did not substantially increase the standard of
living in the region. 5
While economic aid to the Middle East was fai l ing to
improve the stability of the Arab states, the United States
dramatically altered Kennan's conception of containment.
National Security Council [NSC) report 68, completed in
1950, described a world where Soviet military capabilities
5 Anthony Stephens, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil
Companies and the World They Made (New York: Viking Press,
1975), 101-113.

5

posed an immediate threat to the free world.

While Kennan

only wanted to protect vital areas from the Soviets, NSC 68
postulated that any further losses to communism would deal a
serious psychological blow to the western world.

The Korean

War, which began just a short period after the completion of
NSC 68, seemed to validate this new conception of
containment.

In response to this perceived threat, the

Truman administration placed more emphasis on increasing the
military capacity of areas vulnerable to communist
aggression.

6

This new emphasis on military capabilities altered
containment in the Middle East as the administration placed
greater emphasis on arming the Arab states to resist Soviet
aggression.

However, the lingering hatred brought about by

the 1948 Arab-Israeli war made it difficult to allocate
money to arm the Arab states because of congressional fear
of a Middle Eastern arms race with Israel.

The

administration thus attempted to work through the British to
develop a loose Anglo-Arab alliance to increase the military
capabilities in the region.

However, Arab resentment over

the British and American roles in the creation of Israel had
made attaining their cooperation into a defense organization
extremely difficult. 7
6 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 89-101.

7 oean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W.
Norton

&

Company, 1969), 562-65.

6

This thesis examines United States policy toward Israel
from 1948 until 1952 to determine the extent to which the
support given to Israel during the Truman administration
reflected the major United States policy goal in the Middle
East, containment of the Soviet Union.
American policy towards Israel,

In examining

I will describe Truman's

Middle Eastern policy, the manner in which support for
Israel altered the implementation of this scheme, and the
general success of Truman's containment policies in the
Middle East.

CHAPTER 1
PALESTINE AND CONTAINMENT:
1945-1948

During the 1800s, the Middle East was a relative
backwater of American diplomacy.

Aside from occasional

government action to protect American business interests and
missionaries in Arab countries, the United States government
showed little interest in the region.

By World War I, Great

Britain and France politically and economically dominated
the oil rich Arab states.

However, American oil companies

also moved into the Middle East in the aftermath of the
First World War and dramatically increased United States
economic interests in the region. 1
After the Second World War, drastic political and
economic changes compelled the United States government to
play a more active role in the Middle East.

This

development paralleled the heightening of post-war tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union as the
wartime alliance between the Soviets and the western powers
began to unravel.

By 1946, Soviet efforts to create a

1 Robert w. Stookey, America and the Arab States: An
Uneasy Encounter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 168.
7

8
buffer zone of nations in Eastern Europe and the Truman
administration's efforts to maintain some American influence
there placed the United States and the Soviet Union in an
antagonistic position.

Truman then came under intense

domestic pressure to formulate a more effective strategy to
deal with what America perceived as an aggressive Soviet
Union.
In February of 1946 the American charge d'affaires in
the Moscow embassy, George F. Kennan, in response to a
Washington query, penned a lengthy telegram explaining
soviet post-war behavior.

Kennan's "long telegram" became

the genesis of the United States containment policy, which
after 1946, would be the basis of United States policy
towards the Soviet Union.

To Kennan, Soviet foreign policy

had developed to justify the regime's tyrannical internal
policies.

Marxist ideology provided a convenient excuse for

authoritarian rule: a hostile capitalist world.

The Soviets

needed an enemy, and in the post war world the United States
would have to serve as communism's foe.
According to Kennan, then, the Soviets created their
foreign policy to suit domestic requirements rather than in
response to United States policies.
that the Soviets were basically weak.

Kennan also believed
When faced by a

determined adversary, Kennan asserted, the soviets would
retreat.

Therefore, if the United States decisively blocked

soviet attempts to expand, the Soviet Union would realize

9

that an expansionist foreign policy would endanger its
internal security.

Therefore, the United states could

"contain" soviet attempts to expand and let the internal
contradictions of communism erode Soviet power.
Yet the United States did not have the resources to
defend and support every area of the world.

Accordingly,

Kennan stated that the United States should only protect and
strengthen areas vital to American interests, so they would
not fall under Soviet control.

This "strongpoint" defense

would ensure that the United States could defend its
security interests with its limited resources.
Although military strength played a role in Kennan's
thinking, Kennan saw the battle between the United States
and the Soviet Union as primarily a psychological struggle.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union would have to
vie for the favor of less powerful nations.

Kennan stated

in his telegram that "communism is like a malignant parasite
which feeds only on diseased tissue.11 2

Since communism

only had appeal to societies suffering from poverty and
deprivation, Kennan hoped the United States could create
economically, politically, and militarily independent
countries in areas vital to its security so that Soviet
propaganda would have no appeal.

These independent nations

2u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
united States: Diplomatic Papers. 1946 (Washington D.C.:
United states Government Printing Office, 1969), 6: 696-709.
(hereafter cited as FRUS followed by appropriate year)

10
could then resist Soviet aggression, with United States
economic assistance.

If independent powers in vital areas

rebuffed the Soviets, there would be little threat to
American security.

With Soviet growth stunted, the West

could wait patiently while the deficiencies in communism
inevitably weakened the Soviet capacity to expand. 3
Kennan's writing had a remarkable influence on the
Truman administration, which had been moving towards a
policy change.

Based on Kennan's theory, the Truman

administration pursued a new policy based on "patience and
firmness" with the Soviet Union.

Although Europe remained

the major focus of the United States containment policy, the
Middle East also received a good deal of United States
attention.
Officials in Washington had no doubt of the Middle
East's importance to Western security.

Because of the Suez

Canal, the Middle East served as a critical line of
communication for the western powers.

Middle Eastern oil

would be increasingly vital if Europe's shattered economies
were to recover, since by 1945 about 42 percent of world oil
3 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 25-53; Barton
Gellman, Contending with Kennan: Towards a Philosophy of
American Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 37-68;
George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, (Boston: Little Brown
and Company, 1967), 292-95; Martin Herz, ed. , Decline of
the West? George Kennan and his Critics (Washington:
Georgetown University, 1978), 77-102.

11
resources came from the Middle East. 4

Undersecretary of

State Dean Acheson declared in a memorandum sent to
President Truman in October of 1945 that oil reserves in the
Middle East constituted "one of the greatest material prizes
in world history."

Kennan, Secretary of the Navy James

Forrestal and other prominent figures in Washington shared
similar convictions about the strategic value of Middle
Eastern oil. 5
The Middle East's close proximity to the Soviet Union
also made it a critical area.

The Truman administration

believed that a successful defense of the Middle East hinged
on Iran, Turkey and Greece, what policy makers in Washington
commonly called the "northern tier."

These nations would

have to serve as a bulwark against possible Soviet expansion
into the area.

Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of

Near Eastern and African Affairs for the State Department,
asserted on 28 December 1946 that a Soviet victory in
Turkey, Iran, or Greece would allow "Russian power and
4 Bruce Robert Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in
the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980),
183.
5 FRUS, 1945, 8: 45; Acheson, 217-19. Other important
policy makers in Washington shared Acheson's views. James
Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), 323-24; Kennan, 325-26, 380;
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 30; Memorandum, The Joint
Chiefs of Staff to The State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, 8 July 1947, Policy Planning Staff File 112, Box
30, RG 59, National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter
cited by file and/or box number)

12
influence to sweep unimpeded" over the entire Middle East.6
Henderson's fear that the Soviets could easily conquer
the Middle East stemmed from the sorry state of economic
conditions across the region.

The economic, political, and

military weakness of the Arab states, coupled with the
strategic significance of Middle Eastern oil, seemed to
present the Soviets an easy target for aggression or
subversion.

Revitalizing economic conditions in the Middle

East thus became the primary goal in the United states
containment strategy for the area.7
However, economic development would take time and
officials in Washington believed the Soviet threat to the
Middle East was an immediate one.

The Truman administration

believed it had to stop Soviet penetration into the Middle
Eastern region before economic reform could be implemented.
Thus the United States reacted forcefully to Soviet attempts
to gain influence in the "northern tier" during 1946 and
1947.8

Yet despite the Truman administration's success in

foiling Soviet efforts to gain influence in Iran, Turkey,
and Greece, shifts in the western balance of power seemed to
6FRUS, 1946, 5: 1-3.
7FRUS, 1945, 8: 34-48: FRUS, 1946, 7: 6-17: FRUS, 1947,
5: 502-11, 1085-88, 1096-1101, 1153-59: Samir N. Saliba, The
Jordan River Dispute (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968),
16-23: Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and
Hope, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and company, 1956),
156.
8Kuniholm, 302-410.
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imperil the American effort to contain Soviet influence in
the Middle East.

Just as Washington began to place greater

strategic importance on the Middle East, Great Britain found
herself increasingly unable to manage her traditionally
dominant role there.
Great Britain found her position in the Middle East
eroded by two factors.

In the aftermath of the Second World

War, the British faced serious financial difficulties at
home that forced them to curtail foreign aid.

Equally

problematic for Great Britain was the rising tide of Arab
nationalism hostile to British dominance of their nations.
Yet British foreign policy experts believed that their
position in the Middle East was strategically crucial.
British owned oil companies in the Middle East, especially
in Iran and Iraq, were economically important to a
financially strapped Great Britain.

The importance of the

Suez Canal as a trade route made Egypt crucial to the
British.

The British Foreign Office also believed that the

defense of these key areas from the Soviets rested, in large
part, on English military bases in Palestine.

Therefore,

the British had no intention of giving up influence in these
areas of the Middle East. 9
9 Louis, 54-102; Jacob Adabi, Britain's Withdrawal From
the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic
Imperatives (Princeton: The Kingston Press, 1982), 1-30.

14

The British solution to this problem was to reduce
expenditures towards countries that were of peripheral
importance to her critical Middle Eastern interests.

Thus

Great Britain announced in 1947 the termination of aid to
Greece and Turkey.

British officials counted on the United

States to take up large portions of the economic assistance
to the two states.

The British believed that if the

Americans took a greater share of the economic burden in
Greece and Turkey, they could concentrate on developing the
oil producing regions of the Middle East.10
The United States reacted much as the British expected.
To the Truman administration, which saw Greece and Turkey as
the key to defense of the Middle East, the British
withdrawal marked the beginning of the collapse of British
influence in the entire region.

The Truman administration

feared that the ensuing power vacuum would be an open
invitation for Soviet influence in the Arab states.
Consequently, the United States quickly extended aid to
Greece and Turkey.11
In addition, the seeming inability of Great Britain to
protect and develop the Middle East and the steadily growing
fear of Soviet penetration into the region forced the Truman
10Louis, 90-102.
11John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the origins
of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972), 342-51; Kennan, Memoirs, 106-111; Acheson,
217.

15
administration to formulate a specific containment strategy
for the Middle East.

In October and November of 1947,

British and United States officials met in Washington to
discuss Middle Eastern security.

Both Britain and the

United States feared Soviet infiltration or aggression in
the Middle East, an area that both sides considered
important to their nations' security interests.

In the

October and November meetings, which were dubbed the
"Pentagon Talks,"

both sides agreed that improving living

standards in the Middle East was the best way to prevent
communist influence in the region.

The British agreed to

play the major role in the defense and economic development
of the Middle East; but because of Great Britain's financial
difficulties, the United States agreed to help finance
Britain's involvement.

Both nations hoped to pursue

"parallel policies" in the region, so that British manpower
and American money could effectively strengthen the Middle
East. 12
This arrangement suited the foreign policy objectives
of both nations.

The British would be able to maintain

their political and economic position in the Arab world,
with considerable financial aid from the United States.

The

United States would be able to use its limited post-war
means to defend a vital area from the Soviets.
12 Louis, 110-113; FRUS, 1947, 5: 506-583.

According to

16
a State Department memorandum, the United states would make
"economic concessions" in the Middle East so that the
British will "meet our desires in the political and
strategic field."

Therefore, the United states would bear a

considerable portion of the bill for revitalizing the
economies of the Arab states without displacing British
leadership in the region.13
Due to England's colonial dominance of the Middle East,
the American delegation to the Pentagon Talks, which
included George Kennan, feared that the Arab countries would
perceive the Pentagon Talks as a "sphere of influence"
agreement.

The United States delegation, therefore,

emphasized the necessity of increasing the economic
independence of Middle Eastern countries, despite
compromises designed to protect the British position in the
Middle East.

In the end, the United States and Great

Britain agreed to pursue several general plans for the
economic revitalization of the Middle East.

Most of these

economic schemes centered on oil production or large
irrigation and water development projects.

The American

delegation stressed that any economic projects should be
owned and controlled by the Middle Eastern governments.
This would limit traditional British dominance of the
region, while improving the economic strength of Middle
13Ibid., 516-19.

17

.
14
Eastern na t ions.
On 25 November 1947, Truman approved a report developed
at the Pentagon Talks which stated that the security of the
Middle East was ''vital" to the United States and Great
Britain.

The report targeted the improvement of economic

conditions in the Middle East as the best way to contain
Soviet attempts to infiltrate the region.

The report, while

general in nature, also stressed the importance of
maintaining British influence in the region.

The United

States aimed to help the British fund economic
revitalization in the Middle East, but without displacing
British leadership in the region. 15
The policies that Truman approved in November of 1947
were generally consistent with George Kennan's conception of
containment.

The conclusions reached in 1947 recognized

that the United States had limited resources in the Near or
Middle East.

British participation in Middle Eastern

security would free the United States from the primary
responsibility of defending the region, while allowing the
United States to apply its economic strength to the
revitalization of the area.

Despite the continuation of

British influence on Middle Eastern countries, the United
states would work to develop strong, independent Middle
14 I b'd
i
•

,

518, 546-48.

15 Ibid.,
· ·
582-626.

18

Eastern governments that could eventually defend themselves.
The British agreed to these conclusions because they allowed
Great Britain to maintain their economic and political
position in the Middle East, while forcing the United States
to pay for needed economic development.

However, apart from

the increased financial burden accepted by the United States
in the Middle East, the policy goals remained similar to the
aims Truman pursued in the Middle East in the aftermath of
the World War II.
This policy did have one main weakness.

The agreements

reached at the Pentagon Talks assumed that Britain and the
United States would always pursue "parallel policies"
regarding the Arab world.

While the pursuit of similar

Middle Eastern policies had been a consistent post-war
Anglo-American foreign policy goal, issues had risen at the
same time, such as that of Palestine, which threatened
western unity.
While the British and Americans could agree on policies
towards Turkey and Greece, the fate of Palestine had, as
early as 1946, been the major source of Anglo-American
tension in the Middle East.

Ever since the League of

Nations had made Palestine a British protectorate in 1922,
Palestine had posed problems for British policies in the
Middle East.

Along with the mandate, the British inherited

a growing struggle between the native Arab populations and
Jewish settlers, both determined to establish their own

19
nation in Palestine.

Most of the Jewish settlers were

Zionists who believed that all Jews should return to
Palestine, the historic site of their biblical kingdom, and
establish a Jewish state.16
In the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British had
promised to establish a "national home for the Jewish
people" in Palestine.17

However the British had also

promised their Arab allies in World War I that Palestine, as
well as the rest of the Middle East, would become an
independent Arab-controlled nation after the war.18

As the

British took control of Palestine, they refused to honor
either promise.

Both Arabs and Zionists continually pressed

Britain throughout the 1920s and 1930s to fulfill their
specific wishes for the future of Palestine.

Because of the

seemingly irreconcilable Arab-Zionist differences, as well
as Great Britain's proven bad faith, British attempts to
mediate the Palestinian debate proved consistently
16oavid Ben-Gurion, Recollections (London: Macdonald
Unit 75, 1970), 110-31.
17John Norton Moore ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict vol.
3, Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),
31.
1811Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, 1915-1916," in The
Epic of Modern Man: A Collection of Readings, ed. L.S.
Stavrianos (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), 361-62.

20
fruitless. 19
As the Second World War began, Zionist-Arab relations,
violent throughout the inter-war years, grew increasingly
chaotic.

The threat posed by Nazi Germany served as the

catalyst that sparked the tense situation in Palestine into
open warfare.

The British, in the wake of numerous

unsuccessful plans to settle the Jewish-Arab dispute in
Palestine, published a White Paper in 1939 that renounced
the Balfour Declaration and would establish one democratic
state in Palestine that would favor the Arab majorities.
Great Britain decided to support Arab claims in Palestine
because it offered a solution, albeit a one-sided one, to
the Palestinian stalemate.

Winston Churchill, then a vocal

critic of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, also accused
the government of forsaking the Balfour Declaration in "the
vain hope" of mollifying German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, who
violently opposed Jewish claims in Palestine.

Whatever the

reason for the 1939 White Paper, Zionists deeply resented
Great Britain's decision to concede to Arab demands. 20

To

19 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of
Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1947), 762-75, 871-77; Chaim Weizmann,
Trial and Error (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949), 43-55.
20 william Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer
Churchill, vol. 2, Alone: 1932-1940 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1988), 399-400; Moore, 210-29; Esco Foundation,
940-43; David Ben-Gurion, Letters to Paula (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 226-40; Weizmann,
388-416.

21
complicate matters in Palestine further, a flood of European
Jews escaping from Nazi persecution swelled the Jewish
population in Palestine to over 500,000 by 1944.

Arabs in

Palestine, who numbered just over a million, were fearful
they would become a minority in what they considered to be
their own land.

Arab opposition to Jewish immigration

persuaded the British to limit the Jewish influx into
Palestine during and.after the war.
Zionist leaders.21

This further infuriated

The Arab-Zionist dispute over

immigration continued to be a key area of contention in
Palestine up to the birth of an Israeli state in 1948.
As the struggle for control of Palestine became more
heated, both Arabs and Jews resorted to violence to further
their ends.

Terrorism and random violence between Jews and

Arabs, which had occurred periodically during the British
mandate, became an everyday occurrence in Palestine by 1945.
Both Arabs and Jews engaged in a violent series of bombings
and massacres and Palestine was plunged into an undeclared
war.

Great Britain did not escape the violence in Palestine

as their troops suffered through a rash of Zionist terrorist
attacks because of Britain's pro-Arab stance.22
21sami Hadawi and Robert John, The Palestine Diary vol
2. (New York: The World Free Press, 1970), 2-3, 44-45, 19596.
22Ibid., 101-116; Esco Foundation, 1035-49; and Larry
Collins and Dominique Lapierre, o Jerusalem! (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1972), 175-78, 191-95, 201-210.

-

22
The British did not wish to give up Palestine, but they
could not quell the constant Arab-Jewish violence.

The

pressure Palestine placed on Great Britain's treasury, as
well as the British casualties caused by Jewish terrorist
attacks, compelled the British to find a new solution. 23

As

Great Britain announced her decision to cease aid to Greece
and Turkey, the British also placed the Palestinian problem
before the United Nations and promised to remove all her
troops by 14 May 1948.

The British hoped to obtain United

Nations approval for a binational Palestinian state under
English tutelage.

This would favor the Arab majorities,

whom Great Britain supported, and enable the English to
maintain their military bases in Palestine. 24
The rationale behind British support for Arab claims in
Palestine is not hard to understand.

Zionist aspirations

were abhorred not only by the Palestinian Arabs, but by
other Arab nations throughout the region.

This regional

concern for the Palestinian Arabs was a manifestation of one
unique quality of Arab nationalism.

It consisted not only

of a political loyalty to the various emerging Arab nations,
but a sense that all Arabs are members of a larger Arab
community.

This pan-Arabic view led the other Arab

countries to resent Zionist ambitions in Palestine.
2 3 Adab i , 2 9 - 3 1.
24 Louis, 394-96, 458-63.

Arab

23

leaders fanned the flames of this anti-Zionist feeling
amongst the masses to divert attention from their own
economic problems.

The Arab leaders succeeded in focusing

and intensifying their populations' anger towards Zionism
through effective propaganda that stressed the significance
of Palestine to Islam and the supposed wickedness of the
Zionists. 25

The English were well aware of this phenomenon

and did not wish to jeopardize their political position
among the Arab countries by supporting Jewish claims in
Palestine. 26
Unlike the decisive course of action taken during the
British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey, the Truman
administration never formulated a clear course of action for
Palestine.

In 1946 Truman's policy generally supported

Zionist objectives.

The president's first substantial

action in support of Zionism occurred in the aftermath of an
Anglo-American study of the Palestinian problem, published
in April of 1946, which offered general ideas concerning the
political and economic future of Palestine.

The report

stressed that neither Arabs nor Jews should dominate
Palestine and supported some sort of United Nations
trusteeship.

The Anglo-American report also suggested

measures to improve the economic standing of the Arab
25 stookey, 93-106.
26 I

b'd
l. . , 112-117.
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populations and supported admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees
into Palestine.

Although the mechanism for installing this

trusteeship remained vague, the report presented a balanced
proposal that made substantial compromises to both Arabs and
Jews. 27
On 30 April 1946, Truman made his first public comments
concerning the report.

Truman accepted the sections

concerning transferring 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine
while ignoring the political problems in Palestine. 28
Truman, in the following months, continued to pressure Great
Britain to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, but
refused to act on any of the other recommendations in the
report. 29

The British were furious because Truman's support

of drastically increased immigration was divorced from any
overall political settlement in Palestine.

The British

argued that the influx of Jewish immigrants would complicate
an already chaotic situation in Palestine, anger the Arab
nations, and strengthen the Zionists who were killing
British troops in Palestine.

The State Department also

urged Truman to develop a policy towards Palestine that
addressed problems in Palestine other than the refugee
27 Moore, 185-97.
28 Harry Truman, 157-58; Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of
Indecision {Los Angeles: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 149-178.
29 Ibid.
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question.30

Despite British and State Department

opposition, Truman continued his campaign to pressure
Britain into accepting large numbers of Jewish refugees.
This Anglo-American disagreement reached a low point in June
of 1946 when British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin angrily
claimed that the United States supported Jewish immigration
into Palestine because "they did not want too many [Jews] in
New York. 1131
Because of the deteriorating state of Anglo-American
relations, a further effort to reach an Anglo-American
agreement on Palestine took place in July of 1946.

On

24 July an Anglo-American group met to discuss a solution
for Palestine and penned a report known as the MorrisonGrady plan.

The Morrison-Grady plan was more detailed than

the earlier Anglo-American report.

It proposed creating a

federal nation in Palestine composed of an Arab state and a
Jewish state.

Each federal state would control its internal

affairs, while Britain would administer Palestine's foreign
policy and defense.

The -Morrison-Grady plan would allow

100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine one year after Great
Britain and the United States implemented the scheme.
Thereafter the federal states could control their own
immigration, within certain limits.
30 I b'd
1. . , 153-88.
31 New York Times, 13 June 1946.

While the State
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Department and Truman favored the Morrison-Grady plan,
Truman decided not to support its conclusions. 32
Truman's actions concerning Palestine seem strange
considering United States policy objectives in the Middle
East. Truman's support for increased Jewish immigration into
Palestine damaged American relations with the Arab countries
and caused a growing rift between British and American
policies in the Middle East, consequences contrary to United
states policy objectives there.

A number of factors

prompted Truman to support unconditionally increased Jewish
immigration and to reject Anglo-American plans to solve the
political problems in Palestine.
Because of the president's sympathy for the survivors
of the Holocaust, Truman felt that Palestine should be a
haven for the thousands of Jews who survived Hitler's death
camps. 33

Furthermore, Truman hoped that the technical

expertise of Jewish settlers would help economically
revitalize Palestine. 34

Because of these convictions,

Truman tended to be sympathetic towards some Zionist
initiatives, particularly increased immigration into
Palestine.
32

·
FRUS,
1946, 5: 651-62.

33 Harry Truman, 132-33.

34 I b'd
l
•

,

156.
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Although Truman had some compassion for the Zionist
cause, domestic politics also influenced Truman's attitude
toward the Palestinian dilemma.

The Holocaust had

galvanized support for the Zionist struggle in the American
Jewish community.

The overwhelming majority of Jewish-

Americans favored the establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine.

American Zionist supporters formed the American

Zionist Emergency Council (A.Z.E.C), a subgroup of the
United Jewish Appeal, to coordinate the many groups working
to help Jewish settlers in Palestine.

The A.Z.E.C. had

formidable monetary backing and was able to mount an
intensive lobbying campaign in Washington. 35

Truman and

other Democratic party officials feared that losing Jewish
votes over Palestine might cause Democratic congressional
candidates in the Northeast to be defeated in the fall
elections. 36

Pressure from Jewish groups, in large part,

caused Truman's rejection of the Anglo-American Inquiry and
the Morrison-Grady plan.

Jewish-American groups, while

heartened by Truman's stand on immigration, refused to
consider either Anglo-American plan because of the limits it
would have placed on the proposed Jewish states sovereignty.
In particular, Zionist supporters opposed the Morrison-Grady
plan because of the one year waiting period before the
35 Edward Tivnan, The Lobby (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1987), 24-27; Kuniholm and Rubner, 46-47.
36 snetsinger, 24-25.
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admittance of Jewish refugees. 37

In the aftermath of

Truman's rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan, Dean Acheson
admitted to the British that although Truman favored that
Anglo-American plan, "the extreme feelings in centers of
Jewish populations" prevented the administration from acting
on l.' t • 38
supporting increased immigration into Palestine also
proved politically beneficial in another important way.
While a strong core of support for Israel existed in the
large Jewish communities in the Northeast, the majority of
the nation remained apathetic towards the struggle.

Despite

the indifference of the general population towards Israel,
supporting Zionist demands in Palestine proved politically
beneficial in helping Truman resist international pressure
to embrace some of the Jewish refugees.

Despite the plight

of Jewish refugees, Congress had established strict
limitations on immigration and one public opinion survey in
1946 showed that only forty-three percent of those polled
supported allowing any Jewish refugees into the country. 39
In a memorandum to the president in May of 1946, Truman's
administrative assistant David Niles predicted that any
increases in immigration would lead to "terrific resistance"
37 zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 19451948 (New York: Homes and Meir, 1979), 79-83.
38 FRUS, 1946, 5: 673-74.
39 Kuniholm and Rubner, 49.
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by the American public.

He wondered how the United States

could ask other nations to accept Jewish refugees "when we
ourselves are unable to. 1140

Because of domestic opposition

to increased immigration, Truman never seriously pressured
Congress to allow Jewish refugees to immigrate to the United
states. 41

Since allowing Jewish refugees to immigrate to

the United States presented domestic problems, a Jewish
state in Palestine must have seemed an attractive solution
to the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe.
The role of presidential adviser David Niles in forming
a Palestinian policy also bears examination.

Niles began

his government career in the Roosevelt administration where
he worked to secure political support for Roosevelt's
policies among Jewish-Americans.

The Palestinian question

also concerned Niles, who was unabashedly pro-Zionist.
Because of his domestic relationship with Jewish-Americans
and his interest in the Palestinian problem, Niles became
Truman's chief White House adviser concerning ' Palestine from
1945 to 1947. 42

Niles screened all documents concerning

Palestine before he sent them to the president, but many of
those he sent were taken verbatim from Zionist sources and
40 Memorandum, Niles to Truman, 27 May 1946, Harry S
Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Quoted in Tschirgi,
187.
41 Kuniholm and Rubner, 48-50.
42 Ganin, 24-25, 60, 73-74, 103-106.

30

were of questionable objectivity. 43

While Niles' rapport

with Jewish-American groups may have been beneficial to
Truman domestically, as a foreign policy adviser Niles
displayed a distressing ignorance of the situation in
Palestine, particularly concerning the Arabs.

For example,

Niles stated, in a 1946 report, that there was little chance
of a violent Arab reaction against increased Jewish
immigration since most Arabs followed "Gandhi and his
philosophy of nonresistance. 1144

Niles' portrayal of the

Arabs, which minimized their resistance to Zionism, probably
had some bearing on Truman's decisions concerning increased
immigration to Palestine.
The possible effects of Jewish refugees on European
recovery also may have compelled Truman to support increased
immigration into Palestine.

General John H. Hilldring,

assistant secretary of state for occupied areas in Europe,
wrote Assistant Secretary of State Acheson on 3 May 1946
that "military and political interests in Germany and
Austria" made it imperative to resettle immediately Jewish
refugees.

To this end Hilldring urged the administration to

pursue "an aggressive policy of needling the British" to
admit Jewish refugees into Palestine. 45
43

While Hilldring

Ibid.

44 Memorandum, Niles to Truman 27 May 1946, Harry Truman
Library, Independence, Missouri. Quoted in Tschirgi 184-85.
45 FRUS, 1946, 7: 591-92.
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never specifically mentioned how the refugee problem would
adversely affect the political situation in Germany, Truman
viewed any possible threat to European security seriously.
While none of these motivations alone shaped Truman's
policy towards Palestine, the combination of domestic
pressure, from both pro-Zionists and the general public,
Truman's own thoughts concerning Palestine, the situation in
Europe and the influence of David Niles caused Truman to
give United States support to large-scale Jewish immigration
into Palestine.

By supporting increased immigration, Truman

hoped to satisfy domestic pressures and solve a pressing
humanitarian problem.

Eager to solve the Jewish refugee

problem, Truman may have believed, in large part because of
Niles' influence, that a solution to the political questions
in Palestine could be readily attained.
Unfortunately for Truman, this policy failed miserably.
Despite Truman's pleas, the British refused to increase
immigration without a political settlement in Palestine.
Because of this impasse, Great Britain lost interest in
working with the United States to find a solution in
Palestine.

After the failure of the Morrison-Grady plan,

Great Britain decided to use the United Nations to find a
settlement that would restore order and allow the British to
retain some influence in Palestine.

The British placed the

future of Palestine before the United Nations on 28 April

32

1947. 46

Supporting increased immigration did win some short

term support for Truman from Zionist supporters in America,
but it ruined Anglo-American cooperation.

In addition,

Truman found that Jewish-Americans began to demand much more
from him in 1947 and 1948 as the Palestinian question came
before the General Assembly.
On 15 May, the General Assembly formed the United
Nations' Special Committee on Palestine (U.N.S.C.O.P) to
study the crisis and develop a proposal for a settlement.
The U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal, submitted on 3 September 1947,
favored a partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab
and one Jewish.

The two states were to be politically

separate but tied together by an economic union.

Each state

would have almost complete control over issues such as
immigration in their own regions.

To foster the economic

revitalization of the area, U.N.S.C.O.P gave large Arab
controlled areas to the Jewish state, in the hopes that the
Zionists could develop the region.
Zionists roundly applauded this scheme because of its
implicit recognition of the viability of a Jewish state in
Palestine and pledged to form their state as soon as the
British withdrew from Palestine. 47

On the other hand, the

Arab nations pledged to erase any Jewish state from the map
46 Louis, 459-77.
47 Moore, 260-299.
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and looked more favorably on a report published by three
members of the U.N.S.C.O.P commission that dissented from
the majority report.

This minority report, which was

similar to the 1939 White Paper, proposed the establishment
of a democratic state in Palestine, which would favor the
Arab majorities.

The minority report granted political

guarantees for the Jewish minorities and strictly limited
Jewish immigration. 48

The British also supported the

minority report because it would create a Palestinian state
that would be more acceptable to her Arab allies.
Furthermore, the British hoped that an Arab-controlled
Palestine might allow Great Britain to retain some influence
in the state, despite rising Arab nationalism, because any
new Palestinian state, Arab or Jewish, would need
international support. 49
State Department personnel who dealt with the Middle
East had grave reservations about the wisdom of the
partition plan.

Loy Henderson and United Nation's

Ambassador Warren V. Austin told Secretary of State George
C. Marshall, at a meeting on 15 September 1947, that the
United Nations could not implement the partition plan
without military force, considering the violent situation in
48 FRUS, 1947, 5: 1143-45, 1292-93, 1305.
49 Louis, 464-77.
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Palestine. 50

A week later Henderson prepared a report on

the U.N.S.C.O.P. that detailed several reasons why the
United States should not support the plan.

Henderson

emphasized the importance of Arab oil and the severe damage
supporting the partition plan would have on Arab-American
relations.

Furthermore the partition plan gave too much of

.
. h m1nor1
.
' t y. 51
Palestine
to the Jewis

Despite opposition from his foreign policy experts and
the British, Marshall publicly announced United States
support for the U.N.S.C.O.P majority partition plan on
3 October 1947.

The United Nations scheduled a General

Assembly vote on implementing the partition plan for
29 November 1947.

Pressure by the American delegation was

largely responsible for the General Assembly's approval of
the partition plan on that date. 52

The British, stung by

the partition vote, immediately announced that they would
withdraw her troops from Palestine on 15 May 1948.

Zionist

leaders roundly applauded the decision and pledged to form
their nation as soon as the British withdrew from Palestine.
The Arabs also pledged to attack any Jewish state as soon as
SOFRUS, 1947, 5: 1147-53.
51 I b'd
1 . , 1153-59.
52 Hadawi and John, 260-63; Harry Truman; 158; FRUS
1947: 5: 1305-1309; Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First
Arab-Israeli War (New York: World Publishing Company, 1970),
21.
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it was formed. 53
As with support for increased Jewish immigration, the
administration backed the partition plan because of Truman's
beliefs and because of international and domestic pressures.
since Truman's efforts to settle the refugee problem had
failed throughout 1946, the partition plan offered a new
opportunity to resettle Jewish refugees. 54

In addition, as

the United Nations debated the future of Palestine, the Holy
Land plunged deeper into an undeclared war between Arabs and
Jews.

The deteriorating situation heightened Jewish-

American political pressure on the White House to aid the
Zionists. In his Memoirs, Truman later claimed that
political pressure concerning Palestine was the most intense
he ever felt.

Between 1947 and 1949, the White House

received over one million letters supporting Jewish claims
in Palestine.
Congress.

The A.Z.E.C. also effectively lobbied

By 1948 a majority in both houses of Congress had

publicly announced support for a Jewish state in Palestine.
Although Truman grumbled about the occasionally blunt
tactics used by Zionist supporters, the president could not
ignore the domestic support for Zionism among Jewish53 Louis, 492-500.
54 Harry Truman, 156-58.
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Americans because of the upcoming presidential election. 55
As the presidential election neared, Niles' influence
on policies toward Palestine began to wane as special
counsel to the president Clark Clifford gained influence in
the White House.

By 1947, Clifford had become one of

Truman's closest advisers.

While Clifford remained Truman's

chief political adviser, he also often became involved in
foreign policy affairs, particularly concerning Palestine.
Clifford soon became the most important supporter of the
partition plan in the administration.
Some historians have accused Clifford of supporting
partition simply to placate Jewish-American voters. 56
Clifford, for his part, has consistently maintained that
politics were only "a minor factor" in Truman's decision to
support the partition plan. 57

While it is true that other

factors besides politics influenced Truman's decisions
concerning Palestine, the evidence suggests that the quest
for Jewish votes became the major motivation behind United
States policy by November of 1947.

On 19 November 1947,

Clifford explained his strategy for the upcoming 1948
55 Ibid., 158-60; Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New
York: William Morrow & Company, 1973), 381; Forrestal, 30910, 323, 344-45, 363; FRUS, 1947, 5: 1120-21.
56 Historians that share this view include Snetsinger;
Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Alfred
A Knopf, 1983); Kuniholm and Rubner; and Tschirgi.
57 clark M. Clifford, "Recognizing Israel," American
Heritage 17 (April 1977), 11.
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election campaign to the president in a lengthy memorandum.
The Palestinian question loomed large in his thinking.
Clifford considered New York state as "the first prize'' in
any presidential election.

Furthermore, Clifford reminded

the president that, besides Woodrow Wilson, "no candidate
[had] lost New York and won the Presidency."

To win New

York's forty-seven electoral votes, Clifford wrote that
Truman needed strong support from Jewish voters in New York
City to neutralize the Republican majority in the rest of
the state.

Clifford also realized that "the Jewish bloc

[was] interested primarily in Palestine" and United Nations
policies in support of Zionism had the "general approval" of
Jewish-Americans.
While Clifford acknowledged the political advantages of
supporting Zionism, he also stressed that United States
policies towards Palestine should be "founded upon intrinsic
merit" and not "political expediency." 58

While Clifford

emphasized that Truman should not play politics with the
Palestinian question, as the presidential election drew
closer and Truman's chances at winning seemed almost nil
without the Jewish vote in New York City, it became
increasingly difficult for Clifford and Truman to base their
support of partition on "intrinsic merit."
58 Memorandum, Clifford to Truman, 19 November 1947,
Clifford Papers, Harry s. Truman Library. Quoted in
Snetsinger, 95-96.
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While Jewish-Americans hailed Truman's stand on the
partition plan, State Department personnel who had devised
the Middle Eastern containment policy overwhelmingly opposed
it.

A flood of reports and memoranda poured out of the

State Department before and after Truman had decided to
support the partition plan, pointing out the problems that a
pro-Zionist policy posed to a containment policy for the
Middle East.

According to the State Department, supporting

a Jewish state in Palestine would hopelessly antagonize the
Arab states whose friendship the United States was
cultivating.

Arab hostility over this emotional issue would

certainly push the Arab states closer to the Soviet Union
and imperil Middle Eastern oil supplies.

Israel could only

survive, in the eyes of most State Department officials,
with large levels of American economic and military support.
In addition, backing a Jewish state in Palestine would place
the United States in direct conflict with Great Britain, who
militarily supported the Arab nations.

Any substantial

support for a Jewish state would create a situation,
according to all these reports, that would enhance Soviet
efforts to infiltrate the Middle East. 59

George Kennan,

head of the Policy Planning Staff, bluntly stated that
support of a Jewish state in Palestine would be ''directly
counter to our major security interests" in the Middle
59 FRUS, 1947, 5: 1153-59, 166-70; FRUS, 1948 5: 546-66,
573-81, 592-95, 600-603, 617-18, 619-25, 649-55, 666-75.
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East. 60
Truman and Marshall seemed to have been swayed by the
volume of dissent echoing from the State Department, as well
as the growing awareness in Washington that the Arab states
would not abide by the United Nations' partition plan.
Marshall came to view the partition plan as unworkable and
hoped the General Assembly would reconsider the issue of
Palestine.

On 9 March 1948, Marshall, with Truman's

approval, ordered Ambassador Austin to stop actively
supporting partition at the United Nations. If a vote came
up to kill the partition plan, Austin was to abstain and let
it die. 61

By early March, Truman had approved a gradual

withdrawal of support for partition.

This change of tactics

was almost certainly caused by the fear of weakening the
United States containment policy for the Middle East.
By early March, it had become apparent to pro-Zionist
supporters that the Truman administration was trying to
withdraw support for the partition plan.

This policy shift

manifested itself in the United Nations, where the United
States refused to sanction the use of troops to enforce the
partition plan.

Furthermore, the United States delegation,

which had once been the most vocal supporter of partition,
60 I b'd
1 .

,

656.

61 I b 1' d . , 679-85, 701-705.
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began to hint that the plan might be unworkable. 62
Clifford, in response to these actions, launched a campaign
to protect the partition plan.
Clifford penned a report on 8 March 1948 that staunchly
supported partition, but again stressed that domestic
politics should play no part in the president's decision.
Clifford's long range goals for the Middle East were
radically different from those approved by Truman at the
Pentagon Talks.

Unlike Department analysts, who saw support

for the Arab states as the key for stabilizing the region,
CLifford stated that increased aid for Israel would be in
the United States best interest.

Clifford asserted that

contrary to State Department wisdom, moving away from
partition would weaken the United Nations and enhance Soviet
attempts to infiltrate the Middle East.

Rejecting partition

would damage United States credibility by making it appear
that Truman was "trembling before the threats of a few
nomadic tribes. 1163
Clifford also insisted that the Jewish state would
present a stronger and more dependable ally in the Middle
East than the "fanatical Moslems."

Clifford, unlike the

analysts in the State Department, saw that the Jewish
settlers had a good chance of winning the almost inevitable
62 weizmann, 472.
63 FRUS, 1948, 5: 687-96.
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conflict with the Arab states.

By contrast, by early 1948,

most analysts in the State Department shared Secretary
Marshall's conviction that the Zionists could not "hope to
hold out" against the combined weight of the Arab nations. 64
However, Clifford's faith in the Zionist leaders was wellfounded.

By January of 1948, the A.Z.E.C. had raised at

least $50,000,000 for Zionist leaders in Palestine.

These

funds enabled Zionist leaders to train their forces and buy
large quantities of modern military equipment from across
Europe and America and smuggle it into Palestine.

The

Zionist cause had the men, equipment, and leadership to
defend itself by 1948. 65

The economically and militarily

weak Arab states could not hope to match this degree of
funding.
Clifford's report also attempted to minimize the danger
of Arab resentment towards United States support for
Zionism.

Clifford stated correctly, at least in the short

term, that the Arabs depended on revenues from American
companies for economic survival.

In 1948, American oil

companies controlled Arab oil fields and compensated the
Arab political leaders with a large royalty check.

Because

of this economic influence, Clifford asserted that the
64 Kuniholm and Rubner, 45.
65 Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1975),
211-214; Ehud Avriel, Open the Gates! A Personal Story of
"Illegal" Immigration (New York: Atheneum, 1975); Kurzman,
Genesis, 107-108; Tschirgi, 242.
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United States could support Israel and not lose the use of
Arab oil.

Clifford contended that the Arab countries would

never embrace communism because it "would be committing
suicide" to turn away from the United States. 66
While Clifford's analysis proved correct in the short
term, it completely discounted the importance of Arab
nationalism.

Furthermore, Clifford's ideas ran completely

counter to the major goal of the containment policy outlined
at the Pentagon Talks, bolstering the economic well-being of
the underdeveloped Arab states, and sprang from his obvious
contempt for the military and political influence of the
Arab states.

While Clifford's analysis of the Arab states'

power in 1948 proved correct, it overlooked the fact that
the whole premise of the Middle Eastern containment policy
centered on strengthening the Moslem world as a buffer
against the Soviets.

Supporting the partition plan would

surely alienate the Arab states and sabotage attempts to
improve their economies.
As the State Department and Clifford continued their
debate on the course of United States policies in Palestine,
Zionist supporters looked for a direct avenue to the
president to press their case.

However, because of the

intense pressure on the White House Truman refused to meet
with any Zionist supporters.

Desperate for a meeting with

66 FRUS, 1948, 5: 696; Stookey, 70-73.
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Truman, Frank Goldman, president of B'nai B'rith, persuaded
the president's old friend Eddie Jacobson to arrange a
meeting with Chaim Weizmann, a respected Zionist leader.
Jacobson, a Jewish-American and an ardent Zionist supporter,
convinced Truman to meet Weizmann on 18 March 1948. 67
Weizmann, a thoughtful and persuasive speaker, intrigued
Truman with his vision of an economically revitalized
Palestine.

Weizmann reiterated his contention that Jewish

settlers had the technological ability to construct a
Jordanian water project that would improve the living
conditions for all inhabitants of Palestine, both Jewish and
Arab.

Truman, by all accounts, was taken by Weizmann's

message and promised the Zionist leader that the United
States would continue to support the United Nations'
partition plan. 68

Indeed, Clifford's memoranda and

Weizmann's 18 March visit seemed to have revitalized
Truman's support of the partition plan.

Unfortunately for

the president, the State Department had just begun to
implement Truman's earlier decision to withdraw support for
partition.
On 19 March 1948, the day after Truman promised
Weizmann he would continue to support partition, the United
States ambassador to the United Nations, Warren Austin,
67 Tschirgi, 249; Harry Truman, 160-61.
68 weizrnann, 472-73; Harry Truman, 161.
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announced that the partition plan was dead and withdrew
support for the proposed Jewish state in Palestine. 69
Truman claimed, and maintained throughout his life, that he
never approved Austin's speech on 19 March 1948.

The

president asserted that Austin's speech was a ploy by an
anti-Semitic State Department to force him into abandoning
support for Zionism. 70

However, Robert Lovett,

Undersecretary of State, vehemently denied this charge and
maintained that Truman had approved the speech. 71
There has been considerable historical debate on
whether Truman approved Austin's speech.

Truman almost

certainly approved a draft of the speech on the morning of
8 March 1948.
approved

Marshall and Truman also discussed and

withdrawing support for partition on 9 March. 72

However, Clifford's memo and Weizmann's visit came after
Truman approved the speech.

It simply appears that Truman

had another change of heart concerning Palestine after
approving Austin's 19 March speech.
Truman's assertion that State Department officials were
anti-Semitic also merits examination.

While it is quite

possible that some State Department personnel were anti69 FRUS, 1948, 5: 742-44.
70 Margaret Truman, 388; Harry Truman, 159-60, 164.
71 FRUS, 1948, 5: 749-50.
72 Ibid.

, 744-46 and 749-50.
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semitic, there is no compelling evidence that racism drove
State Department opposition to Israel.

While some in the

Department may have disliked Jews, some American officials
also referred to the Moslems as "dirty A-rabs." 73

state

Department officials supported the Arab states, not because
of any hatred for either side, but simply because they
believed that the vast oil reserves in the Middle East made
it strategically vital to strengthen the Moslem world
against communism.

Consequently Department officials

resented the influence supporters of Israel seemed to have
with Truman.
In the aftermath of Austin's remarks, Truman felt the
wrath of outraged Zionist supporters who branded Austin's
speech as an act of appeasement equal to the Munich
Conference of 1938. 74

Whether or not he was misled

concerning Austin's speech, Truman blamed the State
Department for placing him in an embarrassing position.
Despite his displeasure, Truman allowed the State Department
and the United Nations to develop an alternate settlement in
Palestine, based on a United Nations trusteeship.

The

United States delegation at the United Nations worked long
hours in an attempt to set up this trusteeship before the
73 Louis, 484.
74 Ibid., 756-57, 764-65; Henry Levy and Bernard Postal,
And the Hills Shouted With Joy (New York: David McKay
company, 1973), 317-20; Hadawi and John, 323-24.
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removal of British forces from Palestine on 15 May 1948. 75
However, by May of 1948, events in Palestine had made either
partition or a trusteeship obsolete.
Zionist leaders refused to consider any United Nations
plan that did not include a sovereign Jewish state.
Regardless of what the United Nations did, Zionist leaders
announced they would establish their own state in Palestine
in the areas allotted by the partition plan on 15 May 1948,
the day that the British mandate ended. 76

Clifford urged

that the United States immediately recognize the new Jewish
state, while the State Department continued to oppose this
step and supported a trusteeship. 77

As May approached,

Truman remained non-committal concerning Palestine.

The

debate between Clifford and the State Department over
recognition of Israel came to a head at a meeting on 12 May
1948.
At this meeting, which Secretary Marshall described in
a memorandum, Truman and his top advisers bluntly stated
their positions.

Clifford argued that recognition of Israel

would boost American prestige in the United Nations.
Clifford also feared that the Soviet Union would recognize
Israel and that the new state might fall into the Soviet
75 FRUS, 1948, 5: 847-49, 855-57, 859-60, 860-62, 882886, 957-58, 984.
76 I b'd
1 . , 756-57, 764-65.
77 Ganin, 162-63.
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sphere.

On the other hand, Robert Lovett opposed

recognizing the Jewish state until the United States was
certain what kind of government would be established there.
Lovett compared prematurely recognizing Israel to "buying a
pig in a poke."

He also stated that Clifford's advice "was

a very transparent attempt to win the Jewish vote."
Marshall agreed with Lovett's assessment of Clifford's
motives.

Marshall declared that Clifford based his advice

on "domestic political considerations, while the problem
which confronted us was international."

Marshall also

proclaimed that if he were a voter in the upcoming
presidential election and Truman followed Clifford's advice,
he "would vote against the President. 1178
The harsh criticism from Marshall, a man Truman
revered, convinced Truman to reconsider the recognition
question.

However, Clifford continued to pressure Lovett

into supporting recognition.

On 14 May, Clifford informed

Lovett that "the President was under unbearable pressure to
recognize the Jewish state promptly."

Clifford declared

that State Department arguments had at first convinced
Truman to delay recognition, but Truman feared that anarchy
would reign in Palestine on 15 May unless a Jewish state
replaced the British presence in Palestine.

Because of

these reasons Truman had decided to extend de facto
78 FRUS, 1948, 5: 972-77.
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recognition of the new state.

While Clifford's arguments

did not sway Lovett, the undersecretary, fearful that
Marshall might resign and convinced that Truman would
eventually recognize Israel anyway, agreed to work to
implement this new policy. Lovett only asked that Truman
delay recognition for a few days so that the Department
could study the Jewish proclamation and inform their
diplomatic personnel of these developments.

Clifford again

insisted that quickly recognizing the new Jewish state would
be "of the greatest possible importance to the President
from a domestic point of view."

Lovett and Marshall thus

reluctantly went along with Truman's decision on
Palestine. 79
Clifford and Truman carefully concealed their decision
to recognize Israel immediately from the United Nations
delegation, because Truman's recognition of the Israeli
state would surely embarrass Ambassador Austin and the
United States delegation, who had worked for weeks in the
General Assembly to garner support for a United Nations
trusteeship in Palestine.

On 14 May 1948, Clifford only

gave Austin fifteen minutes warning of Truman's decision to
recognize the new Jewish state.

The president's sudden

reversal so disgusted Austin, that he left the United
Nations before the official announcement became known in the
79 rbid., 1005-1007; Walter Isaacson and Walter Evans,
The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 452-53.
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General Assembly.

Furthermore, according to Dean Rusk,

Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the
state Department, when news of Truman's recognition of
Israel became known in the General Assembly, the United
Nations dissolved into "pandemonium."

Rusk also claimed

that Truman's policy reversal so upset members of the
General Assembly that a "U.S. Mission man literally sat on
the lap of the Cuban Delegate to keep him from going to the
podium to withdraw Cuba from the United Nations. 1180
Predictably the Arab states denounced the United States
action.

As soon as Jewish settlers proclaimed the existence

of Israel, the Arab states attacked the new state and the
area plunged into the war.
Despite Clifford's protestations that Truman based his
Palestine policy on "intrinsic merit," the documents clearly
show that political concerns played a key role in Clifford
and Truman's support for the immediate recognition of
Israel.

However, Clifford's analysis of the situation in

Palestine and Truman's sympathy for the plight of European
Jews also had an impact.

Although immediate recognition of

Israel won him support from Jewish-Americans, Truman gained
only a slight reprieve from pro-Israeli pressure.

As the

election neared Jewish voters demanded Truman send military
and economic aid to embattled Israel, a step the State
BOFRUS, 1948, 5: 993.
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Department opposed. 81
In conclusion, Truman's policy towards Israel underwent
two embarrassing public policy reversals in 1948.

Truman's

indecision damaged both Anglo-American and Arab-Americans
relations, as well as injuring United States prestige in the
United Nations.

Unfortunately for Truman, the remainder of

1948 would see another emotional struggle between the State
Department, which continued to promote containment in the
Middle East along the lines established at the Pentagon
Talks, and Clifford who pushed for increased support of
Israel.

And as the election neared, Truman and Clifford

found it increasingly difficult to withstand the political
pressure from Jewish-Americans.
81 snetsinger, 117-119; and Ganin, 188-89.

CHAPTER 2

THE BERNADOTTE PLAN AND CONTAINMENT
MAY 1948-JANUARY 1949

Truman's swift de facto recognition of Israel gained
him broad support in the American-Jewish community.

Jews

around the world hailed President Truman for his actions as
well. 1

Yet the decision had been one that had nearly torn

the Truman administration apart and severely damaged United
States relations with Great Britain and the Arab states.

In

addition, Jewish leaders in Palestine had little time to
celebrate their victory.

On 15 May 1948, within hours of

Israel's declaration of statehood, the Arab League, a loose
alliance of Arab states made up of Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt, attacked Israel.
Domestic and international constraints had limited the
Truman administration's attempts to implement a Middle
Eastern containment policy before May of 1948; the war
further complicated the administration's task.

De facto

recognition had made the United States one of the major
1 snetsinger, 115-119.
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international supporters of Israel.

In the months

following, the Truman administration attempted to sustain
this support for Israel while helping to mediate an end to
the war.

Simultaneously, the Truman administration sought

to strengthen the Arab states and help Great Britain
maintain its status in the Middle East.

Pursuing all of

these goals proved almost impossible for the administration.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli war was a confusing swirl of
violent small engagements that some historians have
hopelessly romanticized. 2

Contrary to popular belief,

Israeli forces were never seriously threatened by the
invading Arab armies.

At the outbreak of the conflict,

Israeli military forces were of at least equal strength,
were better trained, and fielded superior equipment than the
badly disorganized Arab armies.

Although United States

intelligence estimates had underestimated Zionist strength
before the conflict, it quickly became evident that Israel
held military superiority over the Arab states. 3
From 15 May to 10 June, the Arab League prosecuted its
war against Israel, but Arab forces made almost no
penetration into predominantly Jewish regions.

The only

Arab successes of the conflict occurred in Jerusalem and in
2 Dan Kurzman's Genesis 1948 is a good example of this
phenomenon.
3 Green, 66-75; FRUS, 1948, 5: 1158-59 1730; Pablo De

Azcarate, Mission in Palestine: 1948-52 (Washington: The
Middle East Institute, 1966), 98-100, 57-58.
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the Negev desert, which were remote from major Jewish
strongholds.

While only a few Jewish settlers lived in the

desert, the area had been allotted to the Jewish state by
U.N.S.C.O.P.

Although these areas remained distant from the

main body of Jewish troops, the Israelis managed to hold the
northern part of the Negev and maintained their positions in
Jerusalem. 4

After Israel stopped the initial Arab attack,

Jewish forces pushed back the invaders and seized areas in
Galilee that were not part of the U.N.S.C.O.P. Jewish state.
The United Nations, which had been working since 1947
to find a settlement in Palestine, sought to end the
fighting and affect a permanent settlement. The unenviable
task of mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict fell on Count
Falke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross, on 20 May
1948.

During World War II, Bernadotte had used his position

in neutral Sweden to arrange prisoner exchanges between
Allied and German troops.

As the war ended, Bernadotte

delivered a surrender offer by German Gestapo chief Heinrich
Himmler to the Allied command.

Bernadotte was, therefore, a

well known international figure who was well versed in
delicate international negotiations. 5

While Bernadotte

began his mediation in earnest, the battle in Palestine
4 David Ben-Gurion, Israel: a Personal History (New
York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1971), 104-120.
5 sune

o.

Perrson, Mediation and Assassination: Count

Bernadette's Mission to Palestine 1948 (London: Ithaca
Press, 1979), 227-29.
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raged on.
Although the Israelis held a military advantage over
their Arab enemies, Israel maintained a public image of a
nation on the brink of military disaster.

Considering the

tremendous size and population advantages held by the Arab
states, this fiction was easy for Israel to maintain. 6

Such

an inaccurate notion of the Arab-Israeli conflict certainly
served Israel's war effort.

The American Zionist Emergency

Council [A.Z.E.C.] raised $71,800,000 of donations in the
United States for the new state of Israel during a May 1948
visit by Zionist leader Golda Myerson (Meir]. 7

These funds,

combined with the huge sums that the A.Z.E.C. raised in
January of 1948, gave Israel impressive financial resources.
Furthermore, the Zionists began receiving secret
military aid from Czechoslovakia as early as December of
1947.

The Czechs supported Israel in the hope that

Czechoslovakian Jews, a perceived threat to their regime,
would move to Israel. 8

With the Communist takeover in

Czechoslovakia in February · 1948, the flow of arms into
Israel increased and the Soviets approved a Czechoslovakian
plan to train Jewish troops outside of Prague. 9

Soviet

6 Meir, 211-215; Abba Eban, My Country (New York: Random
House, 1972), 17-22.
7 Meir, 233-35.
8 Green, 60-65; FRUS, 1948 5: 1580.
9 Ibid., 69-70.
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support for Israel had also manifested itself in backing for
the United Nations partition plan.

In addition, while the

United States was the first state to extend de facto
recognition of Israel, the Soviets also quickly recognized
the new state and became the first nation to extend the more
formal de jure recognition.
The motives behind Soviet support for Israel were based
on some common ground held by the Zionists and the Soviets
and the joint desire to remove the British from Palestine.
Soviet dogma had, since 1930, denounced Zionism as an
"exponent of the exploiting, big power, imperialist
oppressive strivings of the Hebrew bourgeoisie. 1110

However,

during World War II, Jewish settlers in Palestine gave the
Soviet Union money and supplies to aid in the battle against
Hitler.

This aid to the Soviets, while not of any genuine

military consequence, did build some friendly ties between
Zionist leaders and the Soviets.

The Soviets also hoped

that supporting the Zionists would hasten the departure of
the British from Palestine and place strains on the already
tense Anglo-American and Arab-American relations. 11

Israel

thus found itself in the enviable international position in
1948 of receiving support from both the United States and
10 I b'd
l . , 23.
11 Alden H. Voth, Moscow Abandons Israel for the Arabs:
Ten Crucial Years in the Middle East (Lanham, Maryland:
University Press of America, 1980), 42-53, 65-67.
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the Soviet Union.
This international support for Israel, from both sides
of the iron curtain, left the Arab states without the means
to overcome the restraints of the Anglo-American arms
embargo. The British could not send arms to their Arab
allies because of an earlier Anglo-American arms embargo to
the Middle East.

In an attempt to limit the terrorist

violence leading up to the war in Palestine, the United
States had imposed an arms embargo on the Middle East on
5 December 1947.

In response to the American embargo, the

British also placed an arms embargo on the region.

With

Anglo-American support, the United Nations had also passed a
resolution to institute an arms embargo on Palestine as of
17 April 1948. 12

When the war began in May, the Arab states

demanded arms from their British allies and Jewish-Americans
pressured the United States to supply weapons to Israel.
Unbeknownst to most Zionist supporters in America, who
pressured the Truman administration to end the embargo, the
Israelis were able to use the huge influx of money from
private Jewish contributions to smuggle in arms. 13

American

supporters of Israel were also unaware of the support Israel
12 saul Slonim, "1948 American Embargo on Arms to
Palestine," Political Science Quarterly. 94 (Fall, 1979):
495-514.
13 A. Joseph Heckelman, American Volunteers and Israel's
War of Independence (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974),
72-81; Green, 58-75; Avriel, 327-54.
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received from Czechoslovakia; thus most Israeli supporters
in the United States thought the Zionists were desperately
short of military equipment.

Therefore Jewish-Americans

placed severe political pressure on the Truman
administration throughout 1948 to forward large loans to
Israel and repeal the arms embargo so the United States
could extend military assistance to what they saw as an
embattled Jewish state. 14

At the same time, the Arab states

demanded that Britain, their major military supplier, help
them in their struggle against Israel. 15

However, British

Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin believed that if Great Britain
tried to supply arms to her Arab allies, the United States
would be compelled to drop the embargo and might aid Israel.
If the United States sent military aid to Israel, the
British would be forced by treaty obligations to send
military aid to the Arab states.

Either event would place

the two allies on opposite sides of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. 16
The possibility of an Anglo-American clash over
Palestine seemed possible by May and June of 1948.

In June,

British officials warned Loy Henderson that any Israeli
attack on Transjordan would result in military action from
14 Tivnan, 24-35; Harry Truman, 158-60; Margaret Truman,
384-90.

15 Louis, 362-63.
16 Louis, 536.
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Great Britain, no matter what side the United States
backed. 17

While the thought of facing off against the

United States horrified the Foreign Office, British
officials were clearly determined to defend their interests
in the Middle East. 18

United States officials viewed these

developments as devastating to containment since pursuing
"parallel policies'' in the Middle East with Great Britain
remained a key element in United States containment policy.
Despite the perceived importance of Jewish votes to
Truman's re-election campaign, the administration did not
immediately respond to Zionist demands.

Truman did not

extend economic aid to Israel until January of 1949 and also
refused to lift the Middle Eastern arms embargo.

The

president chose a cautious stance towards Israel in the
latter half of 1948 because of his concerns about
containment and Soviet influence in the Middle East.

United

States officials saw actions such as support for the
U.N.S.C.O.P. partition and the Czechoslovakian arm shipments
to Israel as proof of Soviet efforts to take advantage of
the chaos brought on by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

United

states officials also believed that the goal of Soviet
policy in the region was the removal of British influence in
the Middle East, the creation of instability in the region,
17 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1100-1101.
18 Louis, 535-40.
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and the disruption of Arab-American and Anglo-American
relations. 19
The Soviets did attempt to maintain ties with the Arab
states, even while supporting Zionism.

Throughout the

inter-war years, the Soviet Union had backed Arab claims in
Palestine, because of the Soviet's dogmatic opposition to
Zionism. 20

Although Arab communist parties existed in the

1930s and 1940s, they remained small because of the
conservative nature of Moslem society.

While the Arab

governments were stridently anti-communist, their defeats at
the hands of the Israelis encouraged Arab communist parties,
who played on the anger over United States support for
Israel to win followers. 21

Even more distressing to the

United States was the plight of the 750,000 Palestinian
refugees displaced by the war.

Both the Israeli and Arab

governments refused to deal with this problem and the
Palestinians were forced to live in squalid camps on the
edge of starvation.

To American policy makers, these

destitute people might serve as a prime target for Soviet
propaganda. 22
19 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1580, 1245-1246, 1361.
20 voth, 19-28.
21 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1169, 1182, 1293.
22 Ibid., 1331-32, 1444, 1486, 1491, 1567-68.
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Because of the conservative nature of Arab culture, the
threat of communism did not appear to be a significant short
term threat to most United States officials.

However, the

state Department and the Central Intelligence Agency feared
that the dislocation and misery brought about by a prolonged
conflict would create opportunities for Soviet infiltration
into the Middle East. 23

Furthermore, there was considerable

concern in the State Department that Truman, under political
pressure, would repeal the Middle Eastern arms embargo and
send military hardware to Israel.

If Truman changed his

position on the arms embargo, it might lead to conflict with
the British and place the United States in the position of
making another embarrassing policy reversal before the
United Nations.

These concerns about the arms embargo led

the State Department to reject any Israeli request for
military aid.
In a meeting with Truman on 17 May, Secretary Marshall
told Truman that the United States decision to recognize
Israel had caused "a hell of a mess" and had caused United
States prestige in the United Nations to "hit an all-time
low."

Consequently, any changes in United States policy

concerning the arms embargo, considering previous United
states support for the 17 April arms embargo resolution in
the United Nations, might "give a final kick" to the
23 Ibid., 1246-48.
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authority of the United Nations. 24
The State Department position on Israel was
further clarified by George Kennan and Undersecretary of
state Robert Lovett.

On 21 May, Kennan warned that the

United States should not become the permanent guarantor of
Israeli interests.

By directly backing Israel, the United

States would push the Arab states closer to the Soviets and
endanger important United States interests in the Middle
East.

Kennan also felt, in keeping with the Middle East

containment policy, that the United States should not take
any action that would "bring us into conflict with the
British over the Palestine issue."

In Kennan's opinion,

close United States support of Israel would "disrupt the
unity of the western world and

undermine our entire

policy towards the Soviet Union. 1125

Undersecretary of State

Robert Lovett immediately sent Kennan's memorandum to
Secretary of State Marshall.

Lovett added a brief note that

supported the major points in Kennan's memo. 26

Upon

receiving these memos on 25 May, Secretary Marshall noted
his agreement concerning Palestine. 27
24 Ibid., 1007-1008.

b'd
l
•

,

1020-21.

26 I b'd
l
.

,

1021-22.

25 I

27 Ibid.
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After the start of the war the Israeli government
wasted little time in asking for United States aid.

On

25 May, Truman met with Chaim Weizmann, President of the
Provisional Government of Israel.

In the brief meeting and

in a note Weizmann left with Truman, Israel pleaded for
American military and economic assistance.

On 26 May,

Weizmann wrote another note to Truman in which he reiterated
Israel's plea for assistance and also requested, as did
Israeli Foreign Secretary Moshe Shertok on 19 May, that the
United States and Israel exchange diplomatic
representatives. 28
Marshall agreed with Kennan's very broad policy
objectives: that the United States should not become closely
aligned with Israel and should not further damage AngloAmerican cooperation in the Middle East.

However,

Weizmann's letters forced the United States to formulate
specific responses to requests made by the Israeli
government for military assistance, economic aid, and an
exchange of diplomats.
not long in coming.

The State Department's response was

In a memo delivered to Truman on

26 May, the Department warned that repeal of the arms
embargo would cause "greater bloodshed in Palestine," place
a "serious strain" on Anglo-American relations, and would be
contrary to the Security Council's 17 April resolution.
28 Ibid., 1012-1013, 1042-43, 1050-51.

The
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memo urged that Truman continue to work for an immediate end
to the conflict in Palestine and support United Nations'
attempts to implement an arms embargo. 29
Despite intense Jewish lobbying to repeal the arms
embargo, Truman backed the State Department's
recommendations of 26 May.

Furthermore, on 29 May, the

United States supported another United Nations resolution
including a Palestinian arms embargo.

Although State

Department arguments may have been persuasive, domestic
considerations probably entered into Truman's calculations.
one poll in 1948 indicated that eighty-two percent of the
population opposed any United States military aid to
Israe1. 30

Although Israel had a strong base of support,

with over ninety percent of American Jews extremely
sympathetic to Zionism, over half the non-Jewish American
citizens polled were apathetic towards the fate of Israel.
Israel only became an important election issue to the
general public if the voters perceived the United State
might become militarily involved in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. 31

This domestic opposition to sending military

29 I b'd
1 . , 1026-27.
30 Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion Towards Israel
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1987), 22-25.
31 Eytan Gilboa, "Trends in American Attitudes Towards
Israel,'' in Dynamics of Dependence: U.S.-Israeli Relations,
ed. Gabriel Sheffer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1987), 39-43; Grose, 304-308.
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aid to Israel might explain why Clark Clifford offered
little, if any, opposition to a policy decision sure to
anger Jewish voters.
As for economic assistance, the Israeli government
requested a $100 million loan from the Export-Import bank.
According to Weizmann, Truman assured the Israeli president
that the loan would be approved. 32

However, Truman then

forwarded the loan request to the Export-Import Bank for
consideration and refused to comment on approval of the loan
until the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had
considered the request. 33
While the Export-Import Bank deliberated the Israeli
loan request, another battle developed between Clark
Clifford and the State Department over diplomatic
representation for Israel.

On 27 May, Lovett sent a

memorandum to Truman detailing a State Department plan for
establishing a diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, the capital
of Israel.

President Truman approved this plan and the

State Department worked to establish the mission. 34
However, Clifford penned an angry memorandum on 17 June
criticizing the State Department for not establishing "full
32 weizmann, 480-81.
33 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1072-75.
34 Ibid., 1058-60.
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diplomatic relations" with Israe1. 35
The State Department plan would have created a mission
in Tel Aviv equal in status to the other United States
consulates in the area.

However, Clifford wanted the new

mission to have far greater status than consulates in
Jerusalem or Haifa.

Clifford charged that the State

Department had originally supported greater status for the
Tel Aviv mission and changed their stance to "conciliate the
Arabs."

Clifford also predicted that the State Department

would oppose the selection of any "big calibre man of large
reputation" to be the Israeli minister.

Instead, the

Department would try to place "a career man" in the Israeli
mission to further State Department goals with regard to
Israel. 36
Clifford, much to the annoyance of Marshall and Lovett,
managed to convince Truman to boost the status of the
Israeli mission and appoint a pro-Zionist as special
representative.

On 22 June, Truman selected James G.

McDonald, a prominent pro-Zionist, to head the mission to
Israel.

McDonald became the "special representative" of the

United States in Israel and the ranking diplomat in the
country. Truman also gave McDonald the authority to send
critical information directly to the White House, thus
35 rbid., 1117-1119.
36 rbid.
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bypassing the State Department.

Furthermore, Clifford did

not inform the State Department about McDonald's appointment
until after the president's decision. 37
Clifford's obvious attempt to keep the State Department
in the dark concerning McDonald's appointment deeply upset
Lovett and Marshall.

Lovett told Clifford on 24 June that

McDonald's appointment had angered the secretary of state,
who was in the hospital, and that Marshall had penned a
letter complaining about the procedure used to pick
McDonald. 38

Marshall later told McDonald that he "disliked"

the White House announcing such an important nomination
without his "consultation or comment. 1139

Lovett also

expressed his anger over this incident on 28 June in a
meeting with McDonald.

When McDonald expressed his

opposition to State Department policies in the Middle East,
Lovett sarcastically replied that the State Department was
lucky to have men like Egyptian Ambassador Stanton Griffis
who were not "pro-Arab or pro-Zion or pro-anything, but just
plain pro-American. 1140

While Marshall and Lovett disliked

Truman's decision, McDonald's appointment pleased both the
37 rbid., 1131; James G. McDonald, My Mission to Israel,
1948-1951 (New York: Victor Gollancz, 1951), 3-19.
38 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1140.
39 McDonald, 8.
4 oFRUS, 1948, 5: 1152.
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Israelis and Jewish-Americans. 41
Another pro-Israeli policy that Clifford supported was
the extension of de jure recognition to Israel.

The

difference in de facto and de jure recognition is slight.
De facto recognition, extended to Israel on 14 May, meant
that while the United States fully recognized the existence
of the state of Israel, it would not fully recognize the
Provisional government until they had proven they had the
consent of the people and control of the government.

De

jure recognition would fully accept the current Israeli
government, run by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.

The

more permanent de jure recognition would probably make it
easier for Israel to get economic assistance from the United
States, but the state Department convinced Truman that de
jure recognition should be withheld until the Israelis held
elections.

The Department argued that, because of Israel's

ties with Czechoslovakia, de jure recognition should be
withheld until the administration was certain that noncommunists had control of the Israeli government. 42
Clifford felt that de jure recognition should be given
immediately, but in this case Truman followed State
Department advice. 43
41 snetsinger, 118.
42 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1036-37.
43

rbid., 1060, 1119.
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Early United States dealings with Israel showed the
strains of the two opposing forces within the Truman
administration: the goal of maintaining the Middle Eastern
containment policy versus that of supporting Israel.

While

supporting the State Department's position on de jure
recognition and the Middle Eastern arms embargo, Truman
backed Clifford and appointed a Zionist supporter to
represent the United States in Israel.

Pro-Israeli

supporters, spearheaded by Clark Clifford, continued to vie
with the State Department for Truman's favor during the last
days before the presidential election of 1948.
While the United States tried to clarify its
relationship with Israel, Count Bernadotte worked to find an
Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Bernadotte, through

countless hours of negotiating, persuaded both sides to
accept a four week cease fire on 10 June.

The Arabs only

accepted this cease-fire after suffering serious military
setbacks and receiving heavy pressure from Great Britain to
accept the truce. 44
On 28 June, Bernadotte offered both sides a broad set
of proposals as a basis for a settlement.

Bernadotte

proposed that Arabs and Jews form two separate states joined
together by strong economic ties.

The Arab portions of

Palestine would come under the control of King Ibn Hussein
44 Perrson, 126-45; FRUS, 1948, 5: 1100, 1115.
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Abdullah of Transjordan. 45

By late June, Abdullah had

become a major player in the Palestine controversy.
Abdullah's army, the Arab Legion, had fared much better in
the early fighting than the other Arab forces.

Furthermore

Abdullah was willing to initiate negotiations with Israel .
Because of these factors, the United States and Great
Britain, as well as Bernadotte, placed a good deal of their
hope for a peace settlement on Abdullah. 46
When forming his peace plan, Bernadotte had realized
that the proposed borders established by the United Nations
partition plan were unworkable.

Because of the war, each

side controlled territory that was not part of the United
Nations border.

Bernadotte, therefore, suggested that areas

of Galilee captured by Israel should remain in the Jewish
state, while the Negev desert and Jerusalem should go to a
united Arab state under Abdullah.

This would remedy many of

the shortcomings of the partition plan, which not only
granted Israel a disproportionate amount of Palestinian
land, but also created unworkably confused borders.

The

muddled borders created by the U.N.S.C.O.P plan had prompted
one United Nations delegate to compare the map of the
45 Perrson, 176-207.
·
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·
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partition of Palestine ''to a portrait by Picasso." 47
Bernadette's line of thought concerning a peaceful
settlement in Palestine matched, in most key areas, the
evolving sentiment in the United States government.

On

2 June, Phillip Jessup, Deputy United States Representative
on the United Nations Security Council, detailed how a final
settlement in Palestine might be achieved.

Jessup pointed

out that Israel would survive and that Great Britain and the
Arab states, who refused to recognize Israel's existence,
would have to accept that fact.

Jessup believed that there

must also be an Arab state in Palestine, probably under the
control of Transjordan.

Jessup also considered an economic

union between these two states as critical to a lasting
peace.

To achieve these goals in a peace settlement, Jessup

wrote, both sides should make territorial concessions,
specifically regarding Galilee and the Negev desert.
Jessup, however, stressed that any settlement must come from
the mediator. 48
Jessup's views on a Palestinian settlement were echoed
by the State Department.

Loy Henderson, Director of the

Office of Near Eastern Affairs, told British officials on
6

June that Israel would continue to exist and United States

policy would continue to accept that reality.
47 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1135.
48 rbid., 1088-90.
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also stressed that any territorial concessions made to the
Arab states, specifically in the Negev desert, should be
matched by transferring a part of Galilee to Israe1. 49
While the Department had definite desires concerning
Bernadette's plan, the prevailing wisdom in the State
Department was to let Bernadotte try to work out a
settlement. 50

The State Department, while in no way

controlling Bernadotte, seemed to be confident that the
mediator would develop an equitable settlement.
The major problem in arriving at a settlement in
Palestine was the driving force of nationalism, which seemed
too intense and ingrained to allow either side to compromise
on a peace settlement .

.However, Great Britain had already

demonstrated that she could influence, to an extent, Arab
policies by convincing the Arab League to accept
Bernadette's 10 June truce. 51
State Department officials began to look for similar
leverage with the Israelis.

Robert Mcclintock, Special

Assistant to Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs, wrote Loy Henderson on 18 June suggesting
that the Israeli loan request be used to place pressure on
Israel.

Mcclintock reminded Henderson that the requested

49 Ibid., 1100.
SOibid., 1113-14.
51 rbid., 1121-22.
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Export-Import Bank loan would give the United States
"considerable leverage on the government of Israel."
Mcclintock predicted that any influence the United States
had in the Middle East would be useful in attempts to
persuade Arabs and Jews to accept a final settlement.

To

this end, the State Department delayed consideration of the
loan as Bernadotte attempted to work out a settlement
between the Arabs and the Israelis. 52

While Truman had

assured Weizmann in May of 1948 that the loan would be
approved, he remained noncommittal on the issue until just
prior to the presidential election. 53
The State Department had already largely formed its
position concerning a settlement in Palestine when
Bernadotte released his initial peace plan on 28 June.

On

30 June and 1 July, Phillip Jessup penned two long memos
detailing the opinions of the American delegation to the
United Nations concerning Bernadette's plan. 54

While

Jessup's proposals differed in some ways from Bernadette's,
such as on the status of Jerusalem which Jessup wanted to
make an international enclave and Bernadotte wanted to give
to the Arab state, they were very similar.
52 I b'd
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To Jessup and Bernadotte, a settlement still revolved
on redrawing Palestinian borders to create a more equitable
distribution of land and give Israel "a more compact and
defensible state." 55

Furthermore, the Arab states had to

accept Israel's right to exist and both sides had to agree
to an economic union between Israel and Palestinian Arabs.
Yet Jessup declared that Bernadette's peace initiative would
probably fail when faced by the extreme positions held by
Israel and the Arab states.

However, both men agreed that

the United States and the British could "persuade [the]
parties to come to terms." Jessup also emphasized that
Anglo-American cooperation remained essential, not only in
securing approval for Bernadette's plan, but in preventing
the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East. 56
On 3 July, Marshall, who echoed the sentiments of
Jessup's memorandum, informed the British that the State
Department held a "favorable" impression of Bernadette's
tentative peace plan.

Marshall described Bernadette's

findings as "statesmanlike" and promised to urge "in the
strongest possible terms" that Israel and the Arabs accept
Bernadette's recommendations. 57

The State Department looked

favorably upon Bernadette's proposals because the plan
55 Ibid., 1166.
56 Ibid.
57 rbid., 1186-87.
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allowed the United States to pursue its Middle East
containment policy, despite the existence of Israel.

The

tentative peace plan seemed to offer a fair compromise and
if the Arabs and Israelis could be coaxed into accepting a
peace proposal the chaos in Palestine would end.

The

continuation of the fighting would only help the Soviets
gain ground in the Middle East and slow down the pace of
economic development in the region.

The Department also

believed that Bernadotte•s proposals established common
ground between Great Britain and the United States and
allowed the continuation of Anglo-American cooperation in
the Middle East.
The British also looked favorably on Bernadotte's
conception of a peace settlement since it not only offered a
reasonable chance for a peaceful Palestinian settlement, but
also offered an avenue for Anglo-American accord.

Since

14 May, the British had refused to recognize the existence
of Israel and hoped the Arab states would prevail in
Palestine.

By the latter half of June, the failure of the

Arab League's military effort had become obvious and the
British resigned themselves to the fact that Israel would
survive.

In the face of this inescapable truth, the British

considered Bernadotte's proposals the least objectionable
avenue for her Arab allies. The British hoped that a smaller
Israel would be less likely to control all of Palestine, a
constant British fear.

The British Foreign Office also
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believed that a Jewish state might serve as a catalyst to
unify further the Arab states. 58
However, as Jessup had feared, neither side accepted
Bernadette's proposals.

The Arabs refused to recognize

Israel, while Israel refused to accept any territorial
concessions.

While Bernadotte tried to reconcile Arab-

Israeli differences, the mediator's main problem in early
July centered on getting both sides to extend the four week
truce agreed upon on 10 June.

While the Israelis accepted

the truce extension, the Arabs refused and attacked Israel
on

9

July.
The Arab League resumed combat for a variety of

reasons.

Arab leaders, who had convinced their people they

would destroy the Zionists, faced growing internal pressure
to do something about Israel.

For every day the truce

continued, Israel's military strength grew.

Despite the

arms embargo, Israel's connections with the west and
Czechoslovakia supplied the Jewish state with large amounts
of arms and ammunition. 59

The Arab states could do little

to improve their armies during the truce and daily saw the
military balance swing precipitously towards the Israelis.
The Arab states, facing domestic pressure and a rapidly
deteriorating military
58

situation, therefore decided to

Ibid., 1124-25; Louis, 538-40.

59 voth, 68.
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attack Israel.
The Arabs initially chose to ignore pressure from both
Great Britain and the United States when they launched their
attack on 9 July.

On 8 July, Phillip Jessup had informed

the Arabs that they would face stiff sanctions in the United
Nations, including possible military action if they not
accept the truce.

Syria's United Nations Representative

Faris el-Khouri brazenly retorted that the Arabs were "ready
to be killed by your atomic bombs" and the Arab League
continued its attack. 60

However, the Arabs were not ready

to face Israeli military might.

The Israeli Army sent Arab

forces reeling and within a week had captured considerable
portions of Arab territory. 61

Furthermore, Great Britain

withheld all aid to the Arab states until the fighting
ended.

The United Nations, led by the United States

delegation, threatened to brand the Arab states as the
aggressors in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 62

This combination

of serious military setbacks and growing international
pressure persuaded the Arabs to accept a cease-fire on
18 July.
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While the State Department considered the July fighting
a setback to peace negotiations, events partially vindicated
the effectiveness of coordinated Anglo-American pressure on
protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The brief

resumption of the conflict seriously injured the prestige of
all of the Arab countries except Transjordan.

Abdullah had

favored accepting the United Nations truce extension and
Transjordan avoided any serious fighting with Israel during
the July battles.

To American officials, Abdullah seemed to

be a pragmatic politician while the other Arab leaders were,
in the words of Robert Mcclintock, "fanatical and overwrought.1163
Meanwhile, the resumption of hostilities fueled
domestic pressure from Zionist groups on the Truman
administration to lift the arms embargo, but State
Department pressure and unfavorable public opinion combined
to convince Truman to keep the United States arms embargo in
effect. 64

However, the Democratic National Convention met

in the midst of the July fighting and the events, both at
home and in Palestine, probably helped fuel support for
Israel at the convention.

In response to a supportive, but

somewhat general pro-Israeli pledge in the Republican Party
Platform, the Democrats on 14 July put a plank in their
63 Ibid., 1173, 1230.
64 rbid., 1217-18, 1221-22.
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party platform that promised to make no adjustments to
Israeli borders unless they were "fully
State of Israel."

acceptable to the

The platform also pledged to extend aid

to Israel and to work to repeal the arms embargo. 65
While this gave Truman the inside track to the critical
Jewish vote in New York, the Israeli plank in the platform
could not be reconciled with the Bernadotte plan.

Israel

had shown little enthusiasm for trading away territory won
in the 1948 war.

Israel's first year saw an influx of

almost 250,000 immigrants.

Finding land, food, and

employment for these refugees proved to be a severe problem
for the fledgling Jewish state.

Furthermore, since Israel

had spent most of the funds raised by Jewish-Americans on
military equipment, the Israelis grew increasingly desperate
for money to feed the growing numbers of Jewish settlers in
Israe1. 66

The Israeli government needed every inch of

Palestinian territory it could acquire to accommodate these
refugees.

Considering Israel's desperate need for land,

attempts to gain Israeli acceptance of the Bernadotte plan
would require considerable United states pressure on Israel,
a clear violation of the Democratic party platform.

While

United States policy did not change concerning Bernadette's
65 New York Times, 15 July 1948.
66 The American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Year
Book 1950, ed. Morris Fine, (Philadelphia: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1950), 51: 406-409.
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peace initiative, the Israeli plank in the Democratic Party
platform would soon return to haunt United States diplomatic
efforts with Israel.
However, rather than change policy in July, Marshall
reaffirmed United States confidence in Bernadette's mission
on 19 July. 67

State Department and Central Intelligence

Agency documents still emphasized supporting Bernadette's
attempts at mediation by placing pressure on the Arabs and
the Israelis to accept a settlement.

To place pressure on

Israel, the State Department also reiterated its decision to
withhold Israel's loan request until the Israeli government
agreed to a settlement. 68
Several Israeli actions in August of 1948 gave the
State Department another reason to place economic and
political pressure on Israel to negotiate.

First, Jewish

forces attacked Arab positions across Palestine in clear
violation of the truce.

Secondly, Jewish leaders such as

Golda Meir (Myerson) took a dim view of returning any
territory to the Arabs.

Thirdly, the constant flow of

weapons from Czechoslovakia into Israel also caused serious
concern in Washington about Soviet influence in Israel.

In

sum, the Israelis, according to Phillip Jessup, had become
"increasingly intransigent" towards the Arabs and the peace
67 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1230.
68 I b'd
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process. 69
With this in mind, on 16 August,

Marshall sent a

strong memo concerning United States Israeli relations to
Truman.

Marshall described "systematic violations" of the

United Nations truce by Israel, intransigence in
negotiations by Israeli officials, and "conclusive evidence"
of arms shipments from communist Czechoslovakia.
Considering Israel's "aggressive attitude" Marshall urged
that the United States inform Israel that aid and de jure
recognition would be withheld until Israel became more
cooperative.

Marshall also wanted to stress to Israeli

representatives that the United States would oppose Israeli
aggression just as ardently as it had opposed Arab
aggression in July.

Marshall also reminded Truman that a

war between Israel and Transjordan might very well draw the
"two great Anglo-Saxon partners" into a conflict between
"two little states. 1170

With no objections from Truman,

Marshall sent a note on 21 August to the Israeli government
threatening serious sanctions if Israel made any deliberate
attempts to break the truce. 71
Marshall sent Truman another memorandum on 31 August
discussing the Bernadotte plan, and asked the president to
69 Ibid., 1297-98, 1300, 1302, 1307.
7 oibid., 1313-1315.
71 I b'd
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approve another telegram to Israel stating American support
for the Bernadotte plan in the United Nations.

Marshall

stressed that Bernadette's views on boundary concessions
were similar to United States proposals and would make
Israel "more homogenous and well integrated than the
hourglass frontiers" established by U.N.S.C.O.P.

Trading

Galilee for the Negev would leave Israel, according to
Marshall, "with materially improved frontiers and
considerably enriched in terms of natural resources."
Truman, in a marginal notation, approved this memorandum on
1 September and Marshall subsequently drafted a stern
message to the Israeli government. 72

Marshall's note,

delivered on 7 September, stressed the importance of
territorial concessions, specifically concerning the Negev
desert, to a final settlement.

Furthermore, Marshall

expressed United states willingness to "use all of its
influence to prevent a violation of the truce" whether that
aggressor be an Arab nation or Israe1. 73
The State Department informed Great Britain on
3 September of Marshall's imminent message to the Israeli
government.

The American position on the Bernadotte plan

pleased the British because it officially created an AngloAmerican consensus on

Palestine.

72 Ibid., 1361-1363.
73 Ibid., 1366-69, 1377-78.

Marshall also dispatched

84

Robert Mcclintock to inform Bernadotte of the American
position. 74

As Mcclintock conferred with Bernadotte, the

mediator was putting the finishing touches on his final
peace proposal for Palestine.
signed his peace plan.

On 16 September Bernadotte

The Bernadotte plan matched United

States opinions on a settlement on all major issues,
including the internationalization of Jerusalem.
Unfortunately, the mediator never lived to see the results
of his plan.

On 18 September Jewish terrorists assassinated

Count Folke Bernadotte because of his suggestion that Israel
give up its claim to the Negev desert. 75
United States officials felt that Bernadette's tragic
death would "give the maximum weight to the recommendations
in his report" and pushed to have the Bernadotte report made
public immediately. 76

The United Nations agreed and

released the report on 20 September.

The next day Marshall,

while at a United Nations meeting in Paris, publicly
announced that the United states considered the Bernadotte
plan a "generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine
question."

Marshall went on to urge that the General

Assembly endorse the peace plan that Bernadotte "gave his
74 I b'd
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life for." 77

But, as expected, Israel and the Arab states

rejected Bernadette's plan.

The Israelis refused to give up

any territory in Palestine, especially the vast Negev
desert, while the Arabs refused to sign any agreement that
recognized Israel.

However, Transjordan seemed increasingly

willing to negotiate. 78
Marshall's statement in support of the Bernadotte plan
ignited a domestic firestorm of controversy during Truman's
election campaign.

Israeli supporters in the United States,

including Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace, accused
the president of forsaking the Democratic Party Platform's
pledge concerning Israeli borders. 79

On 28 September,

President Truman met with Clark Clifford and other political
advisers on his campaign train in Oklahoma City to assess
the damage.

Truman and his political advisers drafted a

memorandum to send to Marshall, declaring that Truman's
position on Palestine had always been consistent with the
Democratic Party Platform and that the president's "position
on boundaries had not changed."ao
77 Ibid., 1415-1416.
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Clifford called Lovett on 29 September and declared
that because of Marshall's support for the Bernadotte plan
"the pressure from Jewish groups on the president was
mounting and it was as bad as the time of the trusteeship
suggestion."

Clifford also told Lovett that because of this

pressure, Truman had instructed him to send a memo to the
Secretary of state, repudiating Marshall's position on the
Bernadotte plan.

Lovett then engaged in a "prolonged

argument" with Clifford over plans to place the secretary of
state in an "intolerable position" concerning Palestine.
Lovett informed Clifford that Truman had approved a
memorandum on 1 September which plainly discussed an
exchange of Galilee for part of the Negev.

Furthermore,

Marshall had sent a telegram to the White House Signal
Center the day before his statement on the Bernadotte plan
and there was no objection from the president.

Clifford

"said this was all news to him" and ended the
conversation. 81
In his Memoirs, Truman claimed that he never supported
the Bernadotte Plan because Israel "had to be given the
space and opportunity to prove itself."

Truman stated that

he disliked the plan because "it looked like a fast
reshuffle that gave to the Arabs the (Negev] area. 1182
81 I b 1' d •
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Truman approved the memorandum of 1 September that, in no
uncertain terms, supported the Bernadotte plan.

While

Truman may have been concerned that Israel's security
interests would be jeapordized, Marshall noted no such
objection from the president during their 1 September
meeting.

United States policy, since June of 1948, had

moved towards supporting the Bernadotte Plan as the basis
for settlement in the Middle East.

Marshall and Lovett had

agreed that the Bernadotte Plan offered a fair settlement
and would create an easily defensible Israel while
mollifying the Arabs.

Even Truman conceded in his Memoirs

that "if one looks at the map and how the two partition
proposals appeared there, the Bernadotte plan may have
seemed an improvement" because it reduced "the number of
friction points between Jews and Arabs. 1183
However, in early September, as outraged JewishAmericans pressured the president to support the Democratic
Platform, Truman seemed willing to abandon United States
policy goals.

The key elements of the Bernadotte plan, a

territorial swap between Israel and Transjordan and Arab
recognition of Israel, offered a solid basis for
negotiations.

A negotiated peace would allow the United

States to concentrate on revitalizing the economies of the
Middle East.

Yet, this policy depended on concerted Anglo-

83 Ibid., 166.
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American pressure on both sides to accept the agreement.
While the State Department had been willing to apply
pressure on the Arabs in July, domestic political pressure
shackled American efforts to exert its influence on the
Israelis.
However, despite intense political pressure from
Jewish-Americans, Truman did not immediately rebuke his
secretary of state.

If Truman reversed the United States

position on Palestine, he would leave Marshall in an
extremely embarrassing situation.

Even worse for Truman, if

the truth came out concerning Truman's approval of the
Bernadotte Plan, the presidential campaign might be
endangered.

In addition, Republican presidential candidate

Thomas E. Dewey and Truman had pledged to keep foreign
policy issues out of the campaign.

Truman's political

advisers feared that a statement contradicting Marshall
would look like a political ploy and cause Truman to lose
votes. 84
Therefore, Truman made no public statements retracting
support for the Bernadotte Plan, but the administration did
begin to soften American backing for it.

On 6 October,

Mcclintock wrote to Lovett and stressed that the British
were working hard to secure Arab consent to the Bernadotte
plan and Great Britain looked to the United States ''to do
84 Ibid., 167; Snetsinger, 127.

89

our share" in securing Israeli acceptance of the peace
proposa1. 85

To reiterate American support for the

Bernadotte plan, Lovett planned to deliver a public
statement on 13 October that admitted the Arabs and Israelis
were still deeply divided over recognition of Israel and the
proposed swap of the Negev for Galilee.

Lovett•s statement,

however, concluded that the Bernadotte plan provided a
"sound basis" for negotiations and "it should not be too
difficult to reach an agreement given a real desire on part
of the two peoples. 1186
On 11 October, Clifford sent Lovett a message from the
president, instructing the undersecretary of state to make
no comments concerning Palestine at his 13 October press
conference.

Interestingly, according to a marginal citation

on the draft statement concerning Palestine for the
13 October press conference, Mcclintock noted that Truman
had originally approved Lovett•s statement.

However,

Truman's political aides disapproved of the statement
because they "preferred to say nothing than to give this
statement. 1187
Obviously Truman's political advisers feared that the
positive allusions to the Bernadotte plan in this statement
85 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1459-60.
86 rbid., 1400.
87 Ibid.
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would have further damaged Truman's standing with Jewish
voters.

To bridle further support for the Bernadotte plan,

Truman issued a statement to Lovett on 17 October forbidding
the United Nations delegation to make statements or take
actions concerning Palestine without "obtaining specific
authority" from the president. 88
The White House, while not publicly rejecting support
for the Bernadotte plan, was making sure that there was no
public State Department support for it either.

However,

this all changed on 22 October when Dewey publicly
criticized Truman's handling of the Palestinian issue.
Clifford immediately seized on this violation of foreign
policy bipartisanship as an opportunity for Truman to
"reaffirm [his) support of the Democratic platform."

Truman

subsequently accepted Clifford's urging to make a policy
statement on Israe1. 89

On 24 October the president released

a statement reaffirming support of the Democratic Party
Platform on Israel.

Truman also stressed that he would

expedite the Israeli loan request and extend de jure
recognition after the Israeli election, which would take
place 25 January. 9

°

Furthermore, on 28 October Truman

delivered a pro-Israeli speech in New York City in which he
88 Harry Truman, 167.
89 FRUS, 1948, 5: 1509.
90
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91
once again reaffirmed his commitment to the Democratic Party
Platform.

Truman, while never mentioning the Bernadotte

Plan by name, stated that Israel needed to be "large enough,
free enough and strong enough to make its people selfsupporting and secure. 1191
Truman further undercut State Department support for
the Bernadotte plan in the United Nations on 29 November.
While the United Nations deliberated whether or not the
Negev desert should be part of Israel, Israeli Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion took matters into his own hands.
The Israelis saw the Negev as a vital region for their new
state.

Control of the area would give Israel considerable

room to settle Jewish refugees and provide a buffer zone
between Israel and Egypt.

On 14 October, Israeli forces

moved out from their positions in the northern Negev desert
and attacked Egyptian forces to the south.

Despite United

Nations protests, the Israelis quickly routed the outmatched
Egyptian forces and soon captured all of the Negev. 92

On 28

October, Britain and Nationalist China drafted a United
Nations resolution that would place sanctions on the
Israelis if they refused to withdraw forces from the Negev.
The United states representative at the United Nations,
Warren Austin gave tentative approval to the sanctions.
91 New York Times, 29 October 1948.
92 schiff, 40-45.
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However, Clifford phoned Austin prior to the vote and
informed him that Truman opposed sanctions against Israel.
Austin revoked his support for sanctions during the 29
October session. 93
Political concerns clearly were the major motivation
behind Truman's sudden policy reversal towards Israel in
October of 1948.

After supporting the Bernadotte proposals,

from June until Marshall's public statement on 29 September,
Truman changed his position, as Clifford bluntly told
Lovett, because of Jewish-American political pressure.
Ironically, despite Truman's support for Israel, the
president did not carry New York in the election.

However,

Truman's eleventh hour public statements, reassuring JewishAmericans of strong support for Israel probably helped him
win some other key states.

Many Jewish-American groups, who

saw the survival of Israel as the key issue in the 1948
election, threatened to switch their traditionally
Democratic votes to Dewey or Wallace, both of whom had
publicly backed Israel and rejected the Bernadotte plan. 94
In Ohio, California and Illinois, where Truman only won by a
few thousand votes, an angry bloc of Jewish voters could
have swung those states into the Dewey camp if Truman had
not refuted the Bernadotte Plan.

However, Truman's speech

93 John Donovan, 60; FRUS, 1948, 5: 1527.
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at Madison Square Garden on 29 October convinced Jewish
voters that he would continue to support Israel and helped
Truman garner between 60 and 75 percent of the Jewish vote
nationally. 95

In addition, Truman redeemed his late October

pledges and, on 31 January 1949, announced the de jure
recognition of the Israeli government and the extension of a
$100 million Export-Import Bank loan to Israel. 96

Despite this, the United States continued its attempts
to find a permanent settlement in Palestine.

However,

Truman's policy reversal in October of 1948 effectively
ruined United States attempts to solve the Arab-Israeli
conflict.

Throughout the remainder of 1948 and much of

1949, the United States tried, with no success, to persuade

Israel to accept a territorial compromise.

Most of the

United States diplomats dealing with the Israelis became
exasperated with Israel's inflexible position and aggressive
behavior towards her Arab neighbors.

Lovett suggested

cutting off aid to Israel to force them to be more
cooperative in negotiating peace.

Even President Truman

became exasperated with Israeli intransigence.

Truman

warned Jewish leaders that "unless [Israel] played the game
properly

. they were probably going to lose their best
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friends. 1197
The reason this disapproval never changed official
American policy relates back to Truman's acceptance of the
Israeli plank of the Democratic Party Platform.

The United

States government told Israel on several occasions that the
United States would not back any territorial concessions in
Palestine "without Israeli consent. 1198

Truman yielded to

Jewish political pressure on this issue; Israel realized
that Truman's threats were empty and refused to concede any
territory.

Because of the animosity between the Arabs and

Israelis and the unwillingness of the United States to place
pressure on Israel to negotiate, United Nations' attempts to
find a permanent settlement failed.

Dr. Ralph Bunche, the

head of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Committee,
could only arrange for separate armistices between Israel
and each of the Arab states.

The last of these armistice

agreements was signed on 20 July 1949. 99
Unfortunately, the inability of the United States to
pressure Israel into negotiations dashed any hopes of
reaching a lasting peace settlement.

Truman had approved

strong United States backing for the Bernadotte Plan, a
97 There a re literally dozens of dispatches complaining

about Israeli behavior. Some of the most lively can be
found in Ibid., 657, 658-60, 703-705, 762, 778-79, 810-11,
911, 1060-63. Truman's statement found on p. 1109.
98 I b'd
1 . , 890-93, 681-82.
99
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scheme that had some chance of developing into a permanent
settlement.

While it is doubtful that any plan would have

brought a permanent peace to the entire region, Jordan was
willing to negotiate with the Israelis.

While an Israeli-

Jordanian accord would not have solved all of the problems
that arose from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a permanent
settlement between the two states would have reduced, to a
degree, tensions in the Middle East.

However, the political

pressure placed on Truman by Jewish-Americans, convinced the
president he could not win the 1948 presidential election
without publicly rejecting the Bernadotte Plan.
The United States policy reversal, particularly the
refusal to impose United Nations sanctions on Israel,
infuriated the British, and severely weakened Anglo-Arab
relations.

The British had exerted pressure on their Arab

allies to accept the Bernadotte plan, based on the
assumption that the United States would place similar
pressure on Israel.

The United States policy reversal left

Great Britain in an uncomfortable position with her Arab
allies.

The Arab states harbored deep resentment towards

Britain's ineffective policies.

Arab extremists soon began

assassinating pro-western Arab leaders, including King
Abdullah of Transjordan, and agitating for removal of
British colonial influence across the Middle East. 100
lOOStookey, 121-22.
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hopes for using the British to further containment in the
Middle East had been dashed as British prestige in the
region, already low in 1948, was dealt a fatal blow by the
failure of the Bernadotte Plan.
Unable to develop a comprehensive regional peace plan,
the United States looked for other ways to stabilize the
Middle East and prevent Soviet expansion into the region.
However, the hatred and extreme nationalism on both sides of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the inability of the
United States to deal effectively with these emotions, would
continue to frustrate the Truman administration's attempts
to bring economic and political stability to the Middle
East.

CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND
AND CONTAINMENT
1949-1952

The failure of American policies in 1948 left the State
Department in search of new ways to implement containment in
the Middle East.

The Arab countries railed against the

American and British policies that they blamed for their
military setbacks in 1948.

Zionist supporters continued to

place pressure on the Truman administration to increase aid
to Israel.

Furthermore, the failure to develop a peace plan

for the region left the fate of the Palestinian refugees in
limbo.
To assess the damage done to American standing in the
Arab states, the State Department sent Colonel William Eddy
to the Middle East on a fact finding tour in January of
1949.

Eddy, a retired Marine Colonel, had worked for years

in the Middle East for the State Department, American oil
companies, and the American University in Cairo.

As a

staunch supporter of the Arab states, he had the confidence
of Arab officials. 1

Eddy penned a pessimistic report after

1 Tschirgi, 189-90.
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a three week visit to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon.

He

reported that United States support for Israel and Great
Britain's inability to aid her Arab allies in the war had
completely discredited western diplomacy in the eyes of Arab
leaders.

Furthermore, the Arab states viewed the United

Nations with disdain because of the its inability to enforce
the arms embargo on the Israelis.

The chaos and dislocation

caused by the war, according to Eddy, had left the Middle
East in a particularly vulnerable position vis-a-vis the
Soviets.

Eddy reported that communists "may upset the Iraq

government at any time" and that amongst the 700,000
Palestinian refugees there were "many intellectuals who
(were) more than ripe for Communist propaganda."

Because of

the sorry economic and political situation in the Arab
world, Eddy predicted that "blocked in Western Europe,
Russia will divert her Cold War to the •soft-underbelly' of
the Near East. 112
Eddy's report was widely read by State Department
officials.

In one memorandum reacting to it, Gordon P.

Merriam, a member of the Policy Planning staff wrote an
angry critique of United States policies.

While Merriam

believed that the conservative nature of Moslem society and
the oppressive nature of the Arab regimes would stifle any
immediate communist uprisings in the Middle East, the Arab2 william Eddy, "Observations Concerning Palestine and
the Arab Countries," 20 January 1948, File 31, Box 30.
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Israeli struggle would eventually "promote communism in the
Arab world."

Merriam declared that the United States

already had an effective policy for the Middle East but
Jewish-American political pressure had stopped its
implementation.

Merriam caustically added that even if the

United states approved a more balanced Palestinian policy,
"it would be overturned whenever the Zionists felt like
buying a page in the New York Times."

Merriam felt that the

only hope for salvaging the situation in Palestine was a
large infusion of economic aid. 3
Merriam's memo is indicative of the State Department's
attitude towards the Middle East in 1949.

Department

officials resented pro-Israeli lobby groups that they blamed
for the failures of United States policies in 1948.

While

most officials in the Department believed that supporting
Israel had been detrimental to containment of the Soviets in
the Middle East, communist groups in the Arab world were
still not an immediate threat in 1949. Despite the failures
of United States policies since May of 1948, the Department
still held out hope that economic aid for the Arab states
3 Memorandum, Merriam to Kennan, 18 March 1949, File 79,
Box 30.
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could salvage the situation. 4

As Samuel K.C. Kopper,

Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs, put it,
"an economic boost to [the Middle East) might well alleviate
some of the bitter feeling in the Arab states. 115
This emphasis on economic aid found its way into NSC
47/2, approved by Truman on 20 October 1949.

NSC 47/2

emphasized the importance of revitalizing the economies of
the Middle East to promote stability and keep the Arab
states oriented "towards the west and away from the Soviet
Union. 116
While NSC 47/2 did not address the issue of American
favoritism towards the Israelis, a report written at a
meeting of State Department Middle East experts in Istanbul,
Turkey in November of 1949 did address this key issue.

The

Istanbul reports stated that the most important United
states policy objectives in the Middle East was preventing
"the Soviet Union from gaining control of the Near East
countries by subversion or by any other means short of war."
The report proposed a two part program to contain Soviet
influence in the region.

It suggested giving large amounts

t'
1949, 6: 703-705, 168-79; Memorandum, Matison
to Merriam, 15 March 1949, File 77, Box 30; Memorandum,
Jessup to Kennan, 18 April, 1949, File 82, Box 30;
Memorandum, McGhee to Acheson, 7 June 1950. File 126, Box
30; Memorandum, Merriam to Kennan, 18 March 1949, File 79,
Box 30; FRUS, 1950, 5: 242.
4 FRUS,

5 FRUS, 1949, 6: 705.
6 Ibid., 1430-40.
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of military aid to the Northern Tier countries while giving
the Arab states substantial amounts of economic aid so that
these countries could achieve "economic stability."

To

achieve these goals the Istanbul report stressed the need
for the United States government to maintain "strict
impartiality between the Arab states and Israel. 117

On 30

November, Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee
publicly endorsed the findings in the Istanbul report.
McGhee emphasized the importance of economic development in
the Middle East and emphasized that the United States "had
no axe of special interest to grind" in the region. 8
While regional economic improvement remained the
overall goal of United States policy in 1949 and 1950, the
State Department perceived the refugee problem as the most
pressing obstacle to an effective Middle East containment
policy.

During the 1948-49 war, about 725,000 Palestinian

Arabs fled from Israel.

A fierce historical debate has

raged on whether Israel forced the Arab populations out of
Israel, or Arab propaganda caused unreasonable fear among
Palestinian Arabs who fled from imagined Israeli atrocities.
However recent scholarship indicates that the Israeli
government did systematically chase Arabs out of Israel i
7 Ibid., 168-69.
8 Ibid., 178-79.
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territory. 9

Whatever the reason for the mass exodus of

Palestinian Arabs from Israel, neither the Israelis or the
Arabs would absorb these refugees.

With nowhere to settle,

Palestinian Arabs were forced to occupy squalid refugee
camps, mostly on the West Bank. 10
Colonel Eddy, like many in the State Department, feared
that the dismal economic conditions and resentment felt
towards the United States for its role in the birth of
Israel made the Palestinian refugees likely targets for
communist propaganda. 11

George McGhee stated these concerns

before a congressional committee in February of 1950.
McGhee asserted that Palestinian refugees would continue "to
serve as a natural focal point for exploitation by Communist
elements."

McGhee continued that "the presence of

three-quarters of a million idle destitute people . . .
whose discontent grows with the passage of time, is the
greatest threat to the security of the area that now
9

supporters of the theory that Arab propaganda caused
the refugee problem include, McDonald, 159-60; Meir, 280-81;
Eban, 92-100; and Ralph Martin, Golda: Golda Meir: The
Romantic Years, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988),
326-28;
Recent research by British historian Benny Morris,
with access to previously classified Israeli documents has
cast serious doubts on the previous accounts. See "Operation
Dani and the Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," Middle
East Journal 40 (Winter 1986), 102-106; and "The Harvest of
1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,"
Middle East Journal 40 (Autumn 1986) 671-85.
lOFRUS, 1949, 6: 828-42.
11 I b'd
1 . , 170, 663-64, 698-99, 788.
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exists."12
The long term future of the Palestinian refugees
remained deadlocked in the political struggle between the
Arabs and Israelis.

Negotiations stalemated throughout 1949

on how to deal with the Palestinian refugee problem because
the various armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab
states made no provisions for the refugees.

The Arab states

demanded that Israel repatriate most of these refugees,
while Israel refused to accept any Arab refugees until a
final peace settlement had been signed.
In a 13 January 1949 press conference, Truman expressed
his support for a statement made by Warren Austin on
20 November, 1948.

Austin had asserted that Palestinian

refugees "should be allowed to return to their homes and
that adequate compensation should be arranged for the
property of those who choose not to return. 1113

Accordingly

the Truman administration attempted to persuade Israel to
accept some of the responsibility for the refugee problem.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who replaced Marshall in
January of 1949, sent numerous messages to the Israeli
government, urging it to negotiate on the refugee question.
On 17 February 1949, for example, Acheson requested that the
12 U.S. Congress, House, Committee
.
.
.
on Foreign
Aff airs,
Palestine Refugees: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 81st Congress., 2nd sess., February 1950, 9.
13 FRUS, 1949, 6: 722-23.
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Israelis not place Jewish settlers on land owned by
Palestinian refugees. 14

Despite the insistence of the

United States, Jewish settlers quickly seized and began to
farm land formerly owned by Palestinian Arabs. 15

Acheson

sent another note to the Israelis on 9 March 1949 that
implored the Israelis to allow Palestinian Arabs to return
to Israel.

However, the Israelis continued to refuse to

repatriate refugees. 16
In the face of this Israeli opposition, George McGhee
penned a detailed report on how to implement an effective
policy to solve the refugee problem.

McGhee insisted that

the United States should "persuade Israel to initiate the
gradual repatriation" of Palestinian refugees.

The United

States should also help Israel and Jordan develop a water
project on the Jordan River to increase "the productive
capacity and economic potential of the area."

Acheson

approved McGhee's recommendations on 23 March 1949. 17
This issue, as well as the Israeli refusal to exchange any
14 I b'd
1 . , 754-55.
15 Morris, "Harvest of 1948."
16 FRUS, 1949, 6: 804-805.
17 Ibid., 827-42; Transjordan was the name given the

Jordanian nation when it was under English mandate. Jordan
declared its independence in 1946 and named itself the
Hashmetite Kingdom of Jordan. However, United States
officials continued to refer to Jordan as Transjordan until
the Truman Administration officially extended recognition to
Jordan in January of 1949. Jordan will be used through the
remainder of the paper.
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territory for a peace settlement, caused the State
Department to suggest cutting off aid to Israel in 1949.

As

with territorial concessions, Truman would not place
substantive pressure on the Israelis to cooperate, and
Israel, faced with a huge influx of citizens, refused to
compromise on issues she deemed vital to her national
interests. 18
Unable to find a political solution in Palestine,
Truman approved a policy of increased economic aid to the
Arab states, to give them, in the words of George McGhee,
"incentive to continue to cooperate with the free world by
demonstrating that such cooperation offered more than
adherence to Communism. 1119

However, domestic politics and

the Arab-Israeli conflict hindered the implementation of
these policy objectives.

Despite the administration's

pledge to increase economic aid to the Middle East, only
Israel and the Northern Tier nations received substantial
American aid from 1949 to 1952.

In the aftermath of the

first Arab-Israeli war, the United States Congress remained
pro-Israel.

This support for Israel produced generous

economic aid packages from the United States from 1949 to
1952.

During this period Israel received $221.5 million in
18

Ibid., 811, 911, 1060-63, 1109; Ben-Gurion, ~
Personal History, 149 and 187.
19 FRUS, 1950, 5: 1153.
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official United States economic aid. 20

The Congress also

approved sizable military and economic appropriations to
Turkey and Iran. 21
However, the Arab states received only a fraction of
the economic assistance given to Israel.

From 1949 to 1952

the United States gave the governments of Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria a combined total of
only $14 million in economic aid. 22

While increased

economic aid to the Arab states remained a priority, the
Truman administration had difficulty convincing a proIsraeli and budget conscious Congress to allot money to
Israel's mortal enemies.

Any attempts to arm or extend

substantial aid to Arab states led to criticism from Zionist
supporters in and out of Congress. 23

Despite State

Department pleas for the president to follow NSC
recommendations on Middle Eastern aid, Truman was unable to
convince Congress to approve a more balanced Middle Eastern
20 Agency for International Development, U.S. overseas
Loans and Grants and Assistance From International
Organizations. Obligations and Loan Authorizations. July 1
1945-June 30, 1972 (Washington: statistics and Reports
Division, May 1973), 4-11; The American Jewish Committee,
52: 389-81, 53: 345, 54: 434-35, 55: 113.
21 Agency for International Development, 4-11.
22 Ibid. Economic aid to each Arab state from 1949-1952
in millions of dollars: Iraq .05, Saudi Arabia, 5.2, Egypt,
1.5, Transjordan, 5.2, Lebanon, 2, and Syria, .04.
23 New York Times, 16 January 1950, 27 January 1950,
3 February 1950.
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aid package. 24
According to Acheson, Truman informed him on 28 March,
1950, that ''it would be utterly impossible to get this
Congress, certainly at this time or in the immediate future,
to consider, much less to enact, substantial economic aid
measures for . . . the Middle East." 25

Because of

congressional pressure, the State Department did not even
propose a large-scale economic program for the Arab states
in 1950. 26

The Truman administration tried to present more

balanced Middle Eastern aid packages in 1951 and 1952, but
congressional pressure once again defeated attempts to
increase economic aid to the Arab states. 27
Relief aid to the Palestinian Arabs was the only
meaningful aid the Truman administration could convince
Congress to approve for the Arabs.

Between 1949 and 1952,

the Congress sent over $130 million in relief aid to the
Palestinian refugees through the United Nations Relief and
Work Agency for Palestine Refugees (U.N.R.W.A.).

Although

the United States provided U.N.R.W.A. with over half of its
funds, the relief effort could only provide the Palestinians
24 FRUS, 1950, 5: 1033-34; Memorandum, Jones and Kopper
to Truman, 5 April, 1951, File 89, Box 30.
25 FRUS, 1950, 6: 180-81.
26 I b'd
1 .

,

186.

27 Memorandum, Acheson to Nitze, 2 April, 1951, File 86,
Box 30; FRUS, 1952-1954, 9: 892, 1061, 956-59.
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with the bare necessities of life.

With no political

settlement likely, there seemed little hope for solving the
problem.28

Furthermore, the inability to garner

congressional approval for aid to the Arab states frustrated
attempts to bring about meaningful economic improvements
there.

Since the passage of large scale economic aid to the

Arab states remained politically difficult, the
administration looked for other ways to fund the Arab states
and address the refugee problem.
The Truman administration attempted to use aid for
Israel as a way not only to benefit Israel and placate
Jewish-American groups, but also to foster a regional water
project that would economically revitalize other states in
the region.

Vocal congressional supporters of Israel, such

as Jacob K. Javits of New York, constantly pushed for large
loans and grants to Israel.

According to Javits, large

amounts of American aid for the Jewish state could turn
Israel into ''the focal point" of Middle Eastern industry.
By utilizing the technological ability of Jewish settlers,
Israel could become "not only the bridgehead of democracy in
the Near East but its workshop" to bring the cost of
consumer goods "within reach of the mass of the Arab
people."

Javits believed that Israel would bring prosperity

to the region by creating a large irrigation project on the
28 Mohammed K. Shadid, The United States and the
Palestinians (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) 60-64.
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Jordan River.

This water project would improve economic

conditions in the region and prevent "the next Communist
move westward. 1129

Support for this development scheme came

from Zionist groups, members of Congress, and Secretary o f
the Treasury John W. Snyder, who proclaimed that Israel's
economic capabilities "appear limitless. 1130
The concept that Israel could be the base for the
economic revitalization of the Middle East had already
intrigued Truman.

It also interested Ralph Bunche, head of

the Palestine Conciliation committee (P.C.C.) who, having
failed to reach a final settlement to the 1948 war, looked
towards an economic solution to the Middle East problem.

To

this end, the P.C.C. sent a group to the Middle East, known
as the Economic survey Mission, to find solutions to
economic problems in the Middle East. 31

A water development

program, centering on the Jordan River, became one of the
centerpieces of the Economic Survey Mission's report,
published in December of 1949.
However, this report also found that the political and
emotional scars of the 1948 war would make any cooperation
between Israel and the Arab states difficult.

The Economic

29 The New York Times, 22 May 1949.
30 Ibid., 27 October 1949, 8 June 1949, 15 May 1949,
22 May 1949; FRUS, 1950, 5: 671-74; U.S. Congress 1950,
Palestine Refugees, 1 and 17.
31 saliba, 83; FRUS, 1949, 5: 54-55.
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Mission proposed delaying any major plans for the Jordan
River until the passions of the Arabs and Israelis had
cooled enough so that they could cooperate fully in the
project.

Until that happened, the Economic Survey Mission

suggested the development of small test projects in Israel
and Jordan. 32

In December of 1949, Acheson pronounced the

plan "prudent and wise" and was eager to help the United
Nations fund these programs.

Acheson hoped these programs

would lessen tensions between Jordan and Israel and improve
economic conditions in those two nations, as well as improve
the lot of Palestinian refugees on the West Bank. 33
In May of 1950 Congress approved a plan to fund a
United Nations sponsored regional irrigation and
hydroelectric program for the Jordan River that, according
to Javits, "would unalterably" link Israel "to the fate of
the whole region" and "bring permanent peace and neighborly
relations between Israel and other Near Eastern
countries. 1134

Despite the pledge to fund a Jordanian water

project, no one had yet developed a regional United Nations
plan for the Jordan River.

However, Israel made plans for

the Jordan River that proved much more than small test
projects.

Israel intended to divert a major portion of the

32 Ibid., 1548-51; Saliba, 84.
33 FRUS, 1949, 5: 1557-58.
34 New York Times, 18 May 1950.
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Jordan River's water southward for irrigation and to
generate electrical power.

These plans would divert most of

the Jordan River into Galilee and the Negev desert, thus
depriving Jordan of the benefits of the development and
severely diminishing the flow of the Jordan River eastward.
While not substantially helping Jordan or the refugees, this
plan allowed Israel to deal with the influx of 250,000
Jewish settlers into Israel.

The Israeli government had no

intention of sharing the benefits of a Jordan River water
project with her Arab enemies when these new Israeli
citizens had to be settled. 35
Yet United States plans for economic revitalization in
the Middle East hinged on Israeli generosity, a luxury the
Jewish state was unable and unwilling to provide,
considering its policy of absorbing all of the world's
Jewish population.

With Israel planning a strictly

nationalistic scheme for the Jordan River, the
administration halted its support and the regional Jordanian
water project languished on the backburner of Truman's
Middle Eastern policy.
Another Truman administration attempt to give aid to
the Arab states proved somewhat more effective.

To make up

for its lack of official funding, the administration worked
with American oil companies to help give unofficial aid to
35 saliba, 17-23, 25-29, 72-75; Eban, 77-86.
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the Arab states.

By 1950, the Arab states began to demand

that American and English oil companies share more of the
profits from Middle Eastern oil.
this pressure.

Two events brought about

The Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated the

growing nationalistic feelings among the Arab states, who
felt that western oil companies were exploiting their
natural resources.

However, events in South America

provided the spark that forced western oil companies to make
some economic concessions to the Arab states.

In 1948

Venezuela placed a fifty percent tax on companies producing
oil within her borders.

The Arab states, led by Saudi

Arabia, demanded a similar deal from American oil companies.
Aramco, the oil company which controlled the oil concession
in Saudi Arabia did not want to lose its holdings in Saudi
Arabia, but did not want to lose half of its profits
either. 36
The State Department, which had always worked closely
with oil companies in the Middle East, devised a way to
solve the problems of Aramco, Saudi Arabia, and the Truman
administration.

In a report prepared and delivered to

Aramco on 18 September 1950 the Department stressed to the
oil company the threat of communist influence in the Middle
East.

This threat would prove even more dangerous because

events such as American support for Israel and British
36 stookey, 72: Stephens, 101-110.
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colonialism had made the western powers "unpopular" in the
Arab world.

The Department believed that the oil companies,

which had the "broadest contacts with local peoples at the
lowest level" could convince the Arab states that "oil
operations work to their direct benefit. 1137

Furthermore the

Department hoped that the oil companies could convince the
Arab states that support of the United States would lead to
"economic progress, political stability and the development
of Western orientation and democratic processes."

To that

end, the Department urged Aramco to meet Saudi Arabian
demands for a fifty percent tax on Aramco profits from Saudi
oil fields.

To soften the economic blow on Aramco, the

Department stated that the United States Treasury Department
might give the oil company a tax credit to compensate for
the losses in revenue. 38
Aramco and the State Department reached an agreement in
December of 1950.

Aramco accepted a fifty percent tax from

the Saudi government, which would be considered a foreign
tax by the Treasury Department.

United States tax laws

protected companies from double taxation, therefore Aramco
would not be subject to United States taxes on their Saudi
Arabian profits.

Furthermore, taxes paid to the Saudi

government could be deducted from Aramco's American taxes.
37

FRUS, 1950, 5: 86.
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This saved Aramco millions of dollars and allowed it to give
Saudi Arabia $50 million in additional revenues without
diminishing the company's profits.

Soon all of the major

American oil companies and Middle Eastern oil producing
nations took advantage of this tax loophole. 39
Despite the increases in oil revenue, economic
conditions in the Arab states did not substantially improve.
While the increases in oil revenues enriched the ruling
classes in Arab countries, they used little of this
increased revenue to improve general economic conditions in
the Arab states. 40

However, by persuading American oil

companies to grant generous oil concessions, the Truman
administration avoided threats by the Arab states to
nationalize their industries.

Great Britain, on the other

hand, did not immediately liberalize her concessions and
consequently faced a serious crisis in Iran, where the
government attempted to nationalize Iranian oil interests
and remove British influence from the country.

Eventually

Iranian pressure forced the British to evacuate Iran on
4 October 1951. 41
39 congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Multinational
Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings on
Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy, 93rd
Cong., 2d sess., January 1974, Part 4, 88-95; Stevens, 110112.
40 I b'd
1 . , 110-113.
41 John Donovan, 87-115; Louis, 680-89.
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Throughout 1949 and 1950, efforts by the Truman
administration to find alternate ways to improve economic
conditions in the Arab states proved unworkable or
ineffective.

However, even if aid could have improved

economic conditions in the Middle East, this policy tended
to discount the importance of Arab nationalism.

No amount

of economic aid could immediately lessen the blow to Arab
nationalism that the Israeli military victory had in 1948
and 1949.

The inability of the United States to act in an

impartial manner concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict
poisoned any attempt by the Truman administration to aid the
Arab states. 42
On 1 June 1951, Henry Villard, a member of the Policy
Planning Staff, wrote a memo to Paul Nitze, who replaced
Kennan as its head in 1950, to discuss the effectiveness of
economic aid to the Arab states.

Villard noted that Arab

leaders tended to "look a . . . gift horse in the mouth"
when the United States offered aid to them.

According to

Villard, Arab leaders "distrusted" American intentions and
their mistrust "jumps quickly to the question of Israel and
what Israel is getting out of it."

Villard concluded that

American aid might not "produce the expected returns" from
the Arab states. 43
42 stookey, 121-22; Saliba, 75-81.

43 Memorandum, Villard to Nitze, 1 June 1951, Box 30,
File 132.
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The statements of Arab leaders seem to support
Villard's conclusions.

In July of 1949, Iraqi Prime

Minister Tawfiq Suweidi claimed that United States attempts
to aid the Arab states were little more than "propaganda"
and lacked "good faith, sincerity and earnestness. 1144

The

Secretary of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzaro Pasha,
stated on 22 April 1950 that the Arab states might negotiate
a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union because the
United States remained "pro-Jewish. 1145
By spring of 1950, attempts to improve economic
conditions in the Middle East had begun to stall and the
risk of communism in the Middle East seemed more of an
immediate threat as Arab attitudes became increasingly antiAmerican.

State Department sources in the Middle East also

believed that "Communist activities had increased both in
volume and effectiveness."

An official in Beirut explained

that Communists were able to "play upon the traditional
grievances of the under-privileged Arab people" and "say in
effect . . •

'You'll never get justice out of the West.'"

This official, as well King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia
compared the situation in the Middle East to the recent
communist conquest of China. 46
44
45
46
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As some within the Truman administration began to
question the effectiveness of economic aid for the Middle
East, a major shift in Cold War strategy had already begun
in Washington.

In January of 1950, Truman ordered a group

of State and Defense Department officials to reevaluate the
United States containment policy in the aftermath of the
communist victory in China.

The resulting document, NSC 68,

finished in April of 1950, dramatically altered George
Kennan's concept of containing the Soviet Union.
While Kennan had favored a "strongpoint" defensive
scheme of only protecting "vital" strategic centers from
Soviet influence, NSC 68 suggested a more sweeping policy.
NSC 68 maintained that American allies, as well as the
American public, would perceive any further loss of
territory to the Soviet Union as a victory for communism.
Any communist victory anywhere would damage the prestige of
the United States and harm the morale of the free world.
Therefore, the United states had to defend all non-communist
areas because "a defeat of a free institution anywhere is a
defeat everywhere."

Thus the United States and her allies

had to defend the entire "perimeter" of non-communist states
bordering Soviet and Soviet client states because they now
were all vitai. 47
The conclusions of NSC 68 fundamentally changed the
47 FRUS, 1950, 1: 240; Gaddis, Strategies of
Containment, 90-91.
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Truman administration's containment policy.

In 1950, the

United States did not have enough military forces to even
contemplate implementing a "perimeter" defense of the free
world. 48

Although NSC 68 recommended a considerable

increase in military expenditures, administration officials
remained concerned that a budget conscious Congress would
not appropriate money for a substantial military buildup.
However, the outbreak of the Korean War made a military
buildup easy to sell to Congress, while the manner in which
the communists in North Korea attacked the South seemed to
validate the new emphasis on military preparedness. 49
The implications of NSC 68 were not lost on State
Department personnel trying to implement containment in the
Middle East.

While the Department continued to advocate

increased and impartial economic aid packages for the Middle
East throughout 1951 and 1952, the emphasis shifted towards
increasing the military capabilities of the Middle East to
repel a possible Soviet invasion.

Just as NSC 68 did not

prevent the Truman administration from advocating increased
economic aid, the earlier emphasis on economic problems had
not precluded the administration from pressing for increased
levels of military equipment for the region.

On 11 August

1949, in the aftermath of the final Arab-Israeli armistice
48 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common
Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 476-84.
49 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 93-95.

119

agreement, the United Nations lifted its arms embargo on the
Middle East. 50

State Department policy statements after

August 1949 began to mention shipping arms to the Arab
states.

Although NSC 47/2 emphasized economic development,

it also noted the desirability of supplying "reasonable
amounts of military equipment" to the Middle East to promote
"internal security" in the region. 51
While the United States did not immediately supply arms
to the Arab states, Great Britain did begin shipping small
quantities arms to Egypt and Jordan in early 1950. 52

The

public disclosure of British arms sales to Arab states
sparked considerable controversy in the United States.
Throughout early 1950, Israeli supporters demanded that
Truman prevent the British from arming the Arab states. 53
Furthermore, in March of 1950, thirty-two congressmen met
with Acheson and voiced fears of an "arms race" between
Israel and the Arab states if Britain continued to arm
Egypt.

At this meeting several congressmen threatened to

cut aid to Great Britain because "if the UK could use its
own funds to send arm to the Arabs, it obviously needed no
SOFRUS, 1949, 6: 1302-1304.
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further help from the us. 1154
Despite congressional opposition to arms sales to the
Arab states, the administration continued to look for
avenues to increase military capabilities in the Middle
East.

Truman and Acheson decided to use a planned meeting

of British, French and American foreign ministers in May
1950 to push for "non aggression declarations from the
Middle East countries which could be announced."

Truman

hoped this would remove much of the domestic opposition to
British arms sales to the Arab states.

According to

Acheson, the president "was much interested in this idea. 1155
At the Foreign Ministers meeting, the United states
successfully arranged British and French approval, on 25 May
1950, for a Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East.
This agreement recognized that Israel and the Arab states
had to have enough military power for "self defense and to
permit them to play their part in defense of the area as a
whole."

The agreement stated that any Middle Eastern states

desirous of arms had to pledge not to attack another state.
The agreement also warned that any aggressive actions
undertaken by a Middle Eastern state against another would
be met by "action, both within and outside the United
54
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Nations" from the Tripartite powers. 56
Israel and most of the Arab states approved of the
Tripartite Agreement.

It gave Israel, what their United

Nations Representative, Abba Eban, would later call "a hint
of recognition for Israel's right to security" and it gave
the Arab states access to western weapons. 57

The Tripartite

Agreement also marked the reemergence of attempts to create
Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East.
Even after the failure of the Bernadotte Plan, AngloAmerican talks continued to discuss the importance of a
joint policy in the Middle East, but the American emphasis
on economic revitalization in the region in 1949 had made
Britain cooperation unnecessary.

However, any attempt to

arm the Arabs had to be done through Great Britain because
of domestic opposition.

Even that aid would be difficult to

justify without the guarantees of the Tripartite Agreement.
The conclusions of NSC 68 probably had an effect on the
Tripartite discussions.

United States officials, now faced

with the proposition of defending all areas threatened by
the Soviets, had to find ways to make these commitments
manageable.

Besides having the British arm the Arab states,

United States officials encouraged the British to play a
larger role in the defense of the Middle East.
56

57
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enlisting Great Britain's aid in defense of the Middle East
was hardly a new concept, earlier plans had also stressed
the importance of helping the Arab states become
independent.

By 1950, United states officials were so

concerned about the Soviet threat to the Middle East that
they were willing, at least in the short term, to support
British control of the Arab states.

Phillip Jessup summed

up this attitude on 24 April 1950, when he maintained that
Great Britain "is and should be (a] world power and the more
powerful and worldly the better. 1158
To this end, Acheson discussed with the British the
possibility of creating a loose military alliance of Middle
Eastern states with Great Britain as the chief member.

The

British would supply most of the troops, weapons and
leadership for this organization.

The idea attracted the

British because they hoped to use this threat to maintain
military bases in Egypt. 59

The outcome of the 1948 War had

unleashed Egyptian demands that all British troops leave
their soil.

The British, therefore, supported efforts to

form some kind of military alliance so she could have a
rationale to maintain her bases in Egypt. 60
58 FRUS, 1950, 3: 55.
59 FRUS, 1950, 5: 164-66.
60 Louis, 711-713.
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The Korean War further intensified administration fears
about Soviet aggression in the Middle East.

The

administration held meetings with British officials in July
of 1950 to identify areas vulnerable to Soviet aggression
"in the light of the Korean aggression."

The Middle East

remained, in the eyes of the Anglo-American planners, highly
vulnerable to Soviet attack.

The British agreed to

undertake the "primary responsibility" for defending the
region and the group suggested further study of possible
strategies for that defense. 61
In October, after further study, the State Department
composed a pessimistic note on the military situation in the
Middle East, which concluded that Soviet forces could easily
defeat any regional forces in the area.

This study also

found that Syria and Iraq were vulnerable due to subversive
internal groups and "Russian irregulars operating under the
guise" of a popular uprising.

The report was also somber

about the possibility of improving the situation since the
Arab states could only receive limited amounts of arms.

The

report suggested close Anglo-American collaboration to
develop indigenous armies in the areas. 62
On 27 December 1950 McGhee sent another note to Acheson
concerning the military situation in the Middle East.
61 FRUS, 1950, 5: 189-90.
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McGhee pointed out that, although the British had "primary
responsibility" for defense of the Middle East, Great
Britain could not defend the region alone.

Furthermore, the

Arabs and Israelis were of little military value and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the United States could
not commit troops to the Middle East, in the case of a
general war, for two years.

To McGhee this "clearly implies

that the United State contemplates the abandonment of . . .
the Middle East in time of global war. 1163
McGhee argued that this was intolerable considering the
vital nature of the Middle East.

To prove his point, McGhee

liberally quoted NSC 68, which stated that "commitments in
one area must not be permitted to jeopardize capabilities to
act in other areas."

McGhee argued that abandonment of the

Middle East would allow an area vital to American interests
to fall into Soviet hands.

Equally problematic to McGhee

was the negative "world-wide political repercussions" that
would follow United States abandonment of the region.

To

show United States determination to defend the region,
McGhee proposed to pledge to all states in the Middle East
that Soviet aggression against them would "lead inevitably
to global war."

To increase western capabilities, McGhee

also favored Anglo-American efforts to increase military
capabilities in the region and to encourage states to
63 Memorandum, NEA and McGhee to Acheson, 27 December
1950, File 85, Box 30.
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"participate in the defense of the area, on the basis of
equal-to-equal partnership. 1164
The idea of some type of regional defensive pact in the
Middle East quickly became the centerpiece of American
policy in the region throughout the remainder of the Truman
administration.

On 27 January, Acheson submitted a plan to

the Defense Department to protect American interests in the
Middle East from "the historic movement of Russia southward
to warm-water, to oil, and to mischief-making. 1165

Acheson

proposed that the British establish a "military mission" to
make plans for the defense of the region by the Middle
Eastern countries and Great Britain.

While the United

states would help in developing regional defense plans, and
provide some training and small amounts of arms for the
Middle Eastern states, Acheson stressed that no American
forces would be introduced because of commitments in Europe
and Korea.

Therefore, Great Britain and the indigenous

regional forces would have to defend the area. 66

On 24

September 1951 Truman told Acheson to take "whatever actions
necessary" to develop a Middle East Command. 67
Thus the Truman administration began negotiations with
64 rbid.
65 Acheson, 562.
66 FRUS, 1951, 5: 22-23.
67 Memorandum of Conversation with the President,
Acheson to Nitze, 24 September 1951, Box 30, File 100.
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the British to create a Middle East Command (M.E.C.) that
would plan and coordinate the defense of the region.

The

administration's fear of Soviet aggression in the Middle
East compelled it to increase the western world ability to
defend the region.

However, because of the limited military

means of the United States and the global commitments
described by NSC 68, the Truman administration tried to
defend the Middle East without making military commitments
to the region.

To this end, the idea of a regional military

pact, with Great Britain and the Middle Eastern states
carrying the burden of supplying forces seemed to make
sense.
While United States officials in 1950 perceived a
growing Soviet threat in the Middle East after the outbreak
of the Korean War, the danger to the region was exaggerated.
Soviet relations with Israel had begun to sour in the early
1950s as Israel became increasingly dependent on the United
States. 68

At the same time, Iran and Egypt underwent strong

anti-western movements, but Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin
refused to support either Mohammed Musaddiq in Iran or Gamal
Abdel Nasser in Egypt because he considered them
"untrustworthy, ultimately bourgeois in orientation and an
68 Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinhardz, Israel in the
Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 7677.
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enemy of the socialist future. 1169

While the anti-western

stance of the Arab states may have created openings for
increased Soviet influence in the region, Stalin did little
to take advantage of the situation.
However, State Department officials perceived the antiwestern sentiment in the Arab world as an open invitation to
communist subversion in the region.

The Truman

administration feared Soviet expansion enough to aid the
British in maintaining their colonial outposts in the Middle
East, even though this worked against the policy of
improving relations with the Arab states.

Therefore,

throughout 1951 and 1952, the United States doggedly pursued
negotiations with Great Britain and Egypt, where Britain
stationed most of its troops in the Middle East, to create
the M.E.C.

Unfortunately for the western powers, Egypt and

the rest of the Arab states did not share the Anglo-American
enthusiasm for the M.E.C.

Anger and resentment over their

recent military setbacks, coupled with long standing Arab
grievances over continued British colonial dominance,
combined to deal a devastating blow to British prestige in
the area.

In Egypt, a strong nationalist movement sought to

expel the British. Throughout the heated negotiations, the
British demanded that Egypt join the M.E.C. and the
Egyptians demanded that British troops leave Egypt.
69 voth, 95.
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refused every western attempt to alter its decision on this
point. 70
This difference of opinion, fueled by Arab nationalism,
led Arab leaders to view the world differently than did the
cold warriors in Washington.

While the United States feared

the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the Middle East and
attempted to mobilize the area in a defensive organization,
one Iraqi newspaper claimed "the call of the West finds no
echo in [Arab) hearts."

The Arabs did not consider

themselves a "part of the so-called 'free world' which they
say they are defending."

The Iraqis considered themselves

"part of the oppressed world which is struggling against
[the west] to achieve its freedom and throw off their
yoke. 1171

Further evidence of Arab mistrust of the west came

on 22 November 1951 when the Soviets issued a public
statement which denounced the M.E.C. as a tool of the
western powers designed to subjugate the Arab states.

While

Acheson dismissed this charge as "erroneous," he later
admitted that the Arab states did not find the Soviet
statement "far from the mark. 1172
70 Louis, 692-735.
71 Louis, 713, quoted in Troutbeck to Morrison, 13 June
1951, Foreign Office File 371/91185/El024/35/G, Public
Record Office, London.
72 John Donovan, 80; Acheson, 565.
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Furthermore, because of the enmity between Israel and
her neighbors, Israel could not be an official member of the
Middle East Command, even though she had the best military
force in the region.

Although the administration hoped that

Israel would participate in an informal manner, the Israelis
could not be brought into the alliance until the M.E.C. had
been "firmly established with the Arabs. 1173
Despite the deteriorating position of Great Britain in
the region and the constant tension between Israel and her
neighbors, the Truman administration continued to pursue a
regional defense organization as the central point to its
Middle East policy. 74

Although the United States and Great

Britain renamed the M.E.C., the Middle East Defense
Organization (M.E.D.O) by 1952, the concept of a regional
defense pact under a British commander remained essentially
the same idea and met the same fate as the M.E.c. 75

Despite

intensive efforts by the United States a regional defense
pact was not adopted and became what Acheson later called a
"political stillbirth. 1176
While the conflict in Korea made it expedient for the
United States to push the burden of defending the Middle
73 FRUS, 1951, 5: 186.
74 FRUS, 1952-1954, 9: 168-248.
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East on the British, the administration could not have
picked a worse moment to depend on Great Britain's influence
in the area.

Faced by overwhelming opposition in the Arab

world, and rapidly losing its military and economic power in
the aftermath of World War II, Great Britain was in no
position to become the main defender of the Middle East.
Yet because of the unsettled international picture, even in
the waning months of the Truman presidency, the
administration clung to its efforts to find some way to
implement a defense pact in the area. 77
The futility of United States efforts to extend
economic and military aid to the Arab states, one of the
main objectives of American policies in the region,
frustrated State Department personnel attempting to
implement containment in the Middle East.

The American

ambassador in Lebanon, Harold Minor, expressed these
frustrations during the last days of the Truman
administration when he composed a scathing critique of the
administration's attempts to implement containment in the
Middle East.

Minor, reacting to "the dream world aura" of

United States support for M.E.D.O, wrote the Department to
"play this last (tragic) movement of the Near Eastern
Sonata."

Minor stated his support for an "unbiased" Middle

Eastern policy, "free from Zionist pressures or Arab

77 I b'd
1 ., 288-330.
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emotional intrangencies."

However, the anger caused by

American favor for Israel had left the Arab states to "drift
into chaos."
Minor went on to stress "that mechanisms of power in
[the Middle East] are inadequate to remedy [the] situation
until (the] human, psychological, and political atmosphere
is improved."

In Minor's view, the political strife in the

region made any military organization impossible and
economic aid ineffective unless the "psychological setting"
of the region could be improved.

Minor quoted an Iraqi

official who claimed that "15 billion dollars of (American]
money under these circumstances (would] not win (the] Arab
world and had just as well be poured into the
Mediterranean."

Minor believed that unless the United

states proved to the Arab states she could "say 'no' to
Zionism," the area would go the way of China. 78
Minor's suggestions and criticisms encapsulated the
problems with the Truman administration's Middle Eastern
containment policy.

In an attempt to mollify the Arab

states in the wake of the 1948 war, the Truman
administration made substantial efforts from 1949 to 1950 to
improve the economic conditions of the Arab states.

This

United States aid failed to improve conditions substantially
in the area because of the unsettled political situation in
78 FRUS, 1952-54, 9: 1082-83.

CONCLUSIONS

The Truman administration made substantial efforts from
1948 to 1952 to defend vital American interests in the
Middle East from soviet aggression or subversion.

Because

American officials perceived that the weak Arab states were
a likely target for Soviet attempts to infiltrate the
region, the administration's containment policy centered on
improving the economic standing and military ability of the
Arab states.

However, these attempts to strengthen the

Middle East consistently failed because of the unsettled
political situation in the region and the inability of the
administration to aid the Arab states due to domestic
political support for Israel.
Yet the problems with Truman's policy went much deeper.
The administration, as well as the State Department,
underestimated the depths of Arab resentment over the United
states' role in the creation of Israel.

United States

officials seemed to believe that an influx of American money
would quickly calm the anger of the Arab states.

However,

what was really needed was some demonstration that the
United States could deal impartially with Israel and the
Arab states.

Although the United States constantly

professed its impartiality towards the Arab states and
133
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Israel, the Truman administration constantly favored the
Israelis.

This favoritism towards Israel, the most hated

entity in the Moslem world, entirely prejudiced United
States efforts to aid the region.

Without some effort to

ameliorate the Arab-Israeli conflict, this enmity would
remain constantly to frustrate United States policy
objectives.
Truman's unconditional support of Israel made it
virtually impossible to develop a peace plan agreeable with
the Arab states.

The Truman administration had enough

influence in the region, particularly with Israeli
dependence on American economic aid, to force some kind of
compromise along the lines of the Bernadotte Plan.

Yet the

administration did not feel free to use this leverage on
Israel because of domestic pressure.

Without a settlement,

the Arab states remained embittered towards Israel and her
most ardent international supporter, the United States.
Truman realized this and in the last years of his
administration attempted to find ways to ameliorate Arab
feelings so that these states would not be susceptible to
Soviet subversion.

To this end, the administration sought

to increase economic aid to the Arab states in 1949.
Congressional opposition frustrated many of Truman's aid
programs and the money that did get to the Arab states did
little to lessen their ire towards the United States.
The outbreak of the Korean War and NSC 68 convinced the
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administration that the military capabilities of the Middle
Eastern states had to be improved immediately.

However,

Truman was faced with a myriad of commitments across the
globe and did not wish to commit American troops to defend
the region.

Furthermore, Congress would not send military

equipment to the Arab states.

To defend the Middle East

without a substantial American commitment, Truman attempted
to form a British dominated alliance system among the Arab
states.

However, the Arab states, wary of Britain's

colonial past, would not participate in any regional defense
program and United States' attempts to improve the military
readiness of the Arab states failed.
President Truman was unable to simultaneously balance
the political necessities of supporting Israel and the
strategic requirements of aiding the Arab states.

It is

difficult to blame Truman for supporting Israel, considering
his desperate 1948 presidential campaign.

Nonetheless,

Truman's policies in the region failed to materially
strengthen the Arab states and left them with an abiding
resentment towards the West.

While the Soviets did not

choose to exploit this situation during the Truman
administration, the unsettled situation left ample
opportunities for future Soviet attempts to gain a foothold
in the area.

Therefore, support for Israel during the

Truman administration weakened the United states containment
policy in the Middle East.
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